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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that contribute to both applied and theoretical mi-
croeconomics. The first two essays provide a theoretical framework, empirical evidence,
and an empirical strategy for a better understanding of the seasonality of food insecurity
in developing countries, with a special focus on seasonal price changes of staple foods.
More specifically, the first essay constructs a theoretical model to analyze how seasonal
price changes of a staple food affect farmers’ seasonal consumption in developing coun-
tries, where storage of the staple food can be used to smooth consumption. Crucially, sharp
increases in the price of the staple food just before harvest can be viewed as a high return
to savings, and this has important implications for interpreting the consumption and sav-
ings behavior of poor rural households. Then, the second essay addresses whether and how
farmers smooth their consumption within a crop year, using three years of weekly house-
hold panel data from rural Zambia. Given seasonal price changes of the staple food, maize,
some farmers buy it when prices are low and store it for consumption during the hunger
season, while others run out of the staple food before the next harvest, and so buy it when
prices are high. Results indicate that the former group successfully smooths its consump-
tion, while the latter group reduces consumption during the hunger season in response to a
negative harvest at the end of the previous crop year, and the effect of these negative har-
vest shocks produces an inverse U consumption pattern during the crop year, especially for
farmers with few assets. These farmers reduce their consumption of non-staple foods and
thus reduce their food diversity to maintain consumption of the staple food in the hunger
season in spite of its price hike in that season. The third essay proposes an empirical strat-
egy (the network approach) to analyze complex interactions among several agents, and
illustrates how this approach works by applying it to the analysis of soccer games. By us-
ing a longitudinal data set of all soccer players in the top German league (the Bundesliga)
iii
over the course of ten seasons (2000/01-2009/10), causal peer effects during soccer games
are identified. This unique identification strategy is applicable for other studies to analyze
complex interactions without simplifying the structure of those interactions.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays that contribute to both applied and theoretical
microeconomics. The first two essays provide a theoretical framework, empirical evidence,
and an empirical strategy for a better understanding of the seasonality of food insecurity
in developing countries, with a special focus on seasonal price changes of staple foods.
The third essay proposes an empirical strategy (the network approach) to analyze complex
interactions among several agents, and illustrates how this approach works by applying it
to the analysis of soccer games.
Seasonality is an important aspect of food security for subsistence farmers in devel-
oping countries. Farmers receive agricultural income only at the harvest season, and that
income is uncertain. Their previous year’s harvest stocks gradually dwindle, and some
farmers run out of food before the next harvest. Such farmers need to buy food with cash,
but food prices are usually high right before the harvest season. Those farmers who run out
of food and buy food when prices are high often cannot buy an adequate amount of food.
Most malnutrition and deaths of young children occur in those periods (e.g. Devereux et
al, 2012), and so do famines (e.g. Sen, 1981). Those periods are often referred to as the
1
hunger season (e.g. Devereux et al., 2012, Vaitla et al., 2009, and Khandker and Mahmud.,
2012).
Despite the importance of the topic, little is known about the seasonal consumption
patterns of rural farmers in developing countries, and the seasonal aspect of food insecurity
has received insufficient attention in global efforts to combat rural poverty. The main rea-
son for this is data limitations. Most household level statistics are collected at one point in
time, usually during a slack season on the farm, which is not the “hunger season”. Those
statistics are not suitable for tracing seasonal consumption patterns or for analyzing sea-
sonal hunger, which discourages researchers from working on this topic. This dissertation
provides a theoretical framework, empirical evidence, and an empirical strategy to better
understand the seasonality of food insecurity in developing countries, with the ultimate
goal of recommending policies for tackling seasonal poverty in developing countries. This
dissertation pays special attention to seasonal price changes of staple foods, which are low-
est immediately after the harvest, gradually increase over time, and are extremely high in
the hunger season which occurs right before the next harvest season.
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of farmers’ seasonal con-
sumption under common seasonal price patterns of staple foods. In rural areas of devel-
oping countries, a staple food is often used to achieve consumption smoothing. However,
the theoretical frameworks used in previous analyses of seasonal consumption smoothing
have paid little attention to the use of stocks of staple food to smooth consumption. In
Chapter 2, I discuss how seasonal price changes of a staple food affect farmers’ seasonal
consumption in developing countries, where stocks of staple foods are used as a means
of consumption smoothing and the price of the staple food increases sharply just before
the next harvest. High prices of the staple food just before the harvest can be viewed as
2
a high return to savings that take the form of physical stocks of the staple food, and this
is of significant importance for interpreting the consumption and savings behavior of poor
rural households. I emphasize that models of farmers’ savings should include saving in the
form of stocks of agricultural output. In addition, the findings of the model are used to
re-consider the so-called “sell low, buy high” puzzle in rural areas of developing countries.
Chapter 3 discusses farmers’ heterogenous abilities to smooth consumption. Examin-
ing seasonality of food insecurity as a consequence of farmers’ inabilities to smooth con-
sumption, my co-author and I address whether and how farmers smooth their consumption
during a crop year. We use three years of detailed weekly household panel data from rural
Zambia. Given seasonal price changes of the staple food, maize, some farmers buy it when
prices are low and store it for the hunger season, while others run out of the staple food
before the next harvest, and thus buy it when prices are high. Results indicate that the for-
mer group successfully smooths its consumption, while the latter group is unable to smooth
consumption within the crop year, and in particular, reduces consumption during the hunger
season. These heterogenous results are important for understanding the impacts of pro-poor
programs that offer credit, because they are related to farmers’ heterogenous motivations
for using credit programs: the former group likely wants long-term credit for investment
purposes, while the latter group wants short-term credit for consumption smoothing pur-
poses. This result suggests that optimal schemes and timing of credit should be designed
separately to suit the purpose of each type of farmer. In addition, we find that the latter
group reduces consumption of vegetables and meats to smooth consumption of the staple
food when facing high prices during the hunger season, which likely leads to micronutrient
deficiency problems. This result suggests that micronutrient deficiencies should be part of
any discussion of the problem of seasonal price changes of staple foods.
3
At first glance, Chapter 4 is very different from Chapter 2 and 3. However, they are
related to some extent. Increases of the price of the staple food in the hunger season de-
crease the welfare of net buyers of the staple food in that season. Such farmers are more
likely to be poorer farmers, and thus mitigating seasonal price changes should be an im-
portant policy goal. One possible solution can be market integration, because it can offset
the price variations across different markets. This requires knowledge of the interaction of
food prices across different markets. However, analogous to the identification problem of
peer effects (Manski, 1993), identifying the impact on food prices of one market from the
pricing in other markets is difficult. Due to these difficulties, there are no empirical studies
to analyze the interactions of prices among several markets.
One potential way to overcome these difficulties is the network approach. In order to
illustrate how this approach works, my coauthor and I apply it to the analysis of soccer
games. Chapter 4 identifies intricately woven peer effects in soccer games, using a longi-
tudinal data set of all soccer players in the top German league (the Bundesliga) during ten
seasons (2000/01-2009/10). As Manski (1993) points out, identifying peer effects is not
an easy task. Similar players’ performances can be due to similar but unobserved charac-
teristics of the team members (i.e., correlated effects) or to peer effects. It is also hard to
pinpoint whether one player’s performance is affecting other players, or vice versa (i.e.,
simultaneity effects). Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate endogenous peer effects sepa-
rately from exogenous peer effects. To control for these problems, we impose the network
structure on the players in the game, and apply the spatial econometric methodology sug-
gested by Lee and Yu (2014), which is the network approach. This unique identification
strategy can be applied to analyze other types of complex interactions in teams without
simplifying the structure of those interactions.
4
Together, these three essays shed light on seasonality of food insecurities in developing
countries, with a special focus on seasonal price changes of staple foods. All three essays
provide insight into a theoretical framework, empirical evidence, and an empirical strategy
for a better understanding of the seasonality of food insecurity in developing countries. The
arguments, methodologies, and findings here will be of interest not only to development
economists, but also to policy-makers that are tackling rural poverty.
5
Chapter 2
A Note on the Theoretical Framework
for Seasonal Consumption Patterns in
Developing Countries
2.1 Introduction
Seasonal hunger is an acute problem in developing countries, especially in rain-fed agri-
cultural areas. Many farmers store their harvests for their own consumption until the next
harvest, but sometimes their stocks run out before the next harvest. Such farmers need to
buy food in the last one or two months before the next harvest, but food prices are usually
high at that time. The season just before the harvest is often called the hunger season,
when malnutrition is most common and most child deaths occur (Devereux et al., 2012).
Thus, the impact of seasonal price patterns on seasonal consumption is an important policy
concern. This paper makes two contributions to the theory of consumption smoothing in
developing countries. First, it models household behavior when saving physical agricul-
tural goods is more profitable than saving money. Second, it shows that higher prices in the
6
hunger season may not affect, or may even increase, consumption in that season for house-
holds that save physical amounts of agricultural goods. Third, it re-considers the so-called
“sell low, buy high” paradox, which is discussed in Stephens and Barrett (2011).
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Infinite-period Model
Paxson (1993) initiated modern research on consumption smoothing in developing coun-
tries. Her infinite-period model was subsequently adopted by Dercon and Krishnan (2000),
Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002), and Khandker (2012). Her model assumes that there are
two seasons per year, and considers the following farmer utility maximization problem:
max
fc1t;c2tg1t=1
1X
t=1
2t[u(c1t) + u(c2t)] (2.1)
subject to
1X
t=1
(1 + r) 2t

p1c1t + p2
c2t
1 + r

= W +
1X
t=1
(1 + r) 2t

y1 +
y2
1 + r

(2.2)
where cjt is consumption in season j in year t, yj is income in season j in all years (does not
vary over years), pj represents the price of consumption in season j in all years, W is initial
financial wealth,  is a per season discount rate with   1, and, r is a constant per season
interest rate. Assume that the farmer’s utility function is continuous, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, twice differentiable in all its arguments, and u0(0) = 1. For simplicity
and in order to focus on consumption smoothing within one year, credit constraints, income
uncertainty, and price uncertainty are ignored. The assumption no no credit constraints
will be relaxed in subsection 2.2.2. The first order conditions for this problem yield the
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following expression for each year t:
u0(c1t)
u0(c2t)
= (1 + r)
p1
p2
(2.3)
Paxson (1993) assumes a constant relative risk averion (CRRA) utility function, with a risk
aversion parameter of  ( > 0;  6= 1):
u(cjt) =
c1 jt   1
1   (2.4)
Combining equations (2.3) and (2.4) yields the change in consumption across the two sea-
sons:
 log ct =   1

 log p+
1

log k (2.5)
where  log ct = log c2t   log c1t,  log p = log p2   log p1, and k = (1 + r). Equa-
tion (2.5) shows that a higher relative price of the consumption good in season 2 reduces
 log ct, shifting consumption from season 2 to season 1. This is essentially a substitution
effect. In this model, the farmer borrows and saves in the form of money, but not in the
form of consumption goods. Thus, this model implicitly assumes that either the consump-
tion good cannot be stored over time, or that the return to saving money is equal to or greater
than the return to saving the consumption good. This assumption could be inaccurate and
potentially misleading in situations where farmers save quantities of the consumption good
to smooth consumption (e.g. Kazianga and Udry, 2006, Stephens and Barrett, 2011, Basu
and Wong, 2012). The following subsection assumes that consumption goods can be stored
over seasons, and that saving the physical consumption good is more profitable than saving
money. As will be seen below, this can change the predictions of the model.
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2.2.2 Two-period Model
This section presents a theoretical model that allows for savings in the form of the con-
sumption good. Since it is difficult to solve the infinite-period model with varying saving
rates across seasons, a simpler two-period model is considered.
Two-period Model with One Good
Consider a farmer’s utility maximization decision, written as:
max
c1;c2;B;S
u(c1) + u(c2) (2.6)
subject to p1c1 + p1S = y1 +B (2.7)
p2c2 + (1 + r)B = p2(1  )S + y2 (2.8)
B  B (2.9)
where S is the amount of the staple food stored in season 1, y1 is income, including the
value of the staple food produced, B is borrowing in the form of money, with an upper limit
B,  is the depreciation rate of storage of the consumption good, and other notation is the
same as in the infinite-period model. Equations (2.7) and (2.8) are the budget constraints
in seasons 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that p2 > p1 and that p2 is sufficiently high to
satisfy:
p2
p1
(1  ) > 1 + r (2.10)
This condition implies that saving money is never optimal, because saving by storing the
consumption good is more profitable. Under this condition, the farmer borrows money up
until the upper limit, i.e. until equation (2.9) binds (assuming that storage capacity does
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not bind). This binding monetary borrowing constraint does not sharply constrain reallo-
cation of resources across seasons, because the farmer can reallocate his or her resources
across seasons by storing the consumption good.1 The first order conditions for this utility
maximization problem imply that:
u0(c1)
u0(c2)
= (1  ) (2.11)
Assuming a CRRA utility function, equation (2.11) yields the optimal change in consump-
tion over the two seasons,
 log c =
1

log k0 (2.12)
where  log c = log c2   log c1, and k0 = (1   ). Note that higher prices in season
2 do not affect seasonal consumption patterns. Intuitively, this is because high prices in
season 2 affects farmers in two ways: through the high consumption good price in season
2, and through the higher return to savings in season 2. Seasonal price hikes in season 2 do
not affect seasonal consumption patterns, because the negative effect of a higher price on
consumption in season 2 is offset by the positive effect of higher returns to savings and the
consumption good must be consumed in season 2.2
Two-period Model with Two Goods
Next consider an increase in the price of the consumption good during the hunger season,
relative to the price of another, non-produced consumption good; the theoretical framework
above can be extended to two goods. This is basically the model of Stephens and Barrett
1A higher B can be interpreted as a greater share of life cycle income received in season 1.
2When p2(1   )=p1  1 + r holds, (and the assumption of S  0 replaces equation (2.9)), this Euler
equation with a CRRA utility function becomes equation (2.5).
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(2011) and Basu and Wong (2012) but, unlike those models, it imposes equation (2.10).3
The farmer’s utility maximization problem is;
max
c1;x1;c2;x2;B;S
u(c1; x1) + u(c2; x2) (2.13)
subject to p1c1 + x1 + p1S = y1 +B (2.14)
p2c2 + x2 + (1 + r)B = p2(1  )S + y2 (2.15)
B  B (2.16)
where xj is a non-produced consumption good in season j with a time invariant price,
normalized to one, and all other notation is the same as before. The first order conditions
for this problem yield the following:
 u
0(c1)
u0(c2)
= (1  ) (2.17)
 u
0(x1)
u0(x2)
=
p2
p1
(1  ) (2.18)
Assuming the following CRRA utility function
u(cj; xj) =
c1 j   1
1   +
x1 j   1
1   (2.19)
3Basu and Wong (2012) considered three possibilities to transfer assets across seasons - saving in kind,
saving cash, or borrowing. If equation (2.10) holds, farmers will want to borrow money to purchase and
save as much of the staple good as possible, so unlike Basu and Wong (2012), saving in kind and borrowing
can happen simultaneously. If equality holds for equation (2.10), saving cash and borrowing are redundant.
These differences show that the sign in equation (2.10) is the key to induce different implications.
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equations (2.17) and (2.18) yield the following (optimal) changes in consumption over
time,
 log c =
1

 log k0 (2.20)
 log x =
1

 log p+
1

log k0 (2.21)
where  log c = log c2   log c1,  log x = log x2   log x1,  log p = log p2   log p1,
and k0 = (1   ). Note that equation (2.20) is identical to equation (2.12): the effect of
high prices in season 2 is offset by the high returns to savings. In contrast, equation (2.21)
implies that an increase in the relative price of the consumption good in season 2 increases
the relative consumption of the non-produced good in season 2. This occurs because the
price of x2 is time invariant while the returns to savings, due to the higher price of c2, are
high. This implication is the opposite of that for Paxson’s infinite-period model in which
farmers save using money; in Paxson’s model, a higher relative price of the consumption
in season 2 reduces  log c.
2.2.3 Adding Borrowing Constraints of Produced Consumption Goods
to the Model
Thus far, the model has allowed the possibility that S < 0. That is, a farmer could borrow
the staple food for consumption in season 1, and repay it in season 2. Now, consider the
case where such borrowing is impossible. This constraint is
S  0 (2.22)
Consider adding equation (2.22) to the two-period model with two goods in the previous
section. If the strict inequality of (2.22) holds, the implications of the previous section are
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unchanged. However, once equation (2.22) binds, that is, once the farmer exhausts his or
her stocks in season 1, he or she cannot reallocate consumption across from season 2 to
season 1 any more, and cash in hand in either season is used only for consumption in that
season. In this case, a higher price for the produced staple good in season 2 would decrease
its consumption in season 2 through income and substitution effects. Thus, income and
substitution effects decrease consumption in season 2 only if the farmer would like to, but
cannot, borrow physical amounts of the staple good in season 1.
2.3 Re-considering the “Sell Low, Buy High” Puzzle
This section explains how the two-period model with two goods in the previous section can
be used to explain the “sell low, buy high” puzzle, in which some farmers sell staple foods
(the consumption good) when prices are low, and in the same year, such farmers buy them
when prices are high. The first subsection discusses why the so-called “sell low, buy high”
puzzle happens, explicitly assuming equation (2.10).4 I then conduct welfare analysis to
see who gains or loses welfare due to seasonal price increases in the hunger season. The
second subsection provides a diagramatic representation to provide an intuitive explanation
for “sell low, buy high” puzzle.
4Stephens and Barrett (2011) provide on explanation for the “sell low, buy high” puzzle, but do not
explicitly discuss the assumption of equation (2.10). When the inequality in equation (2.10) holds, every
farmer borrows up until upper limit, that is, every farmer hits the binding credit constraint regardless of his
or her trade patterns (“sell low, buy high”, or not) of staple foods. Nevertheless, they compare a farmer with
a binding credit constraint with a farmer without a binding credit constraint, though the latter farmer should
not exist in theory. When the inequality in equation (2.10) is replaced by an equality, “sell low, buy high”
behavior is no longer a paradox, because the savings in the form of money and the savings in the form of
staple foods are equivalent, that is, “sell low, buy high” for staple foods is equivalent to “buy low, sell high”
for money.
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2.3.1 “Sell low, buy high” puzzle
To understand the “sell low, buy high” puzzle, it is useful to distinguish income in kind
from cash income. Let y1 = p1y + wL1 and y2 = wL2 where y is the amount harvested
at the beginning of season 1 and wLj is an exogenous cash income wLj at the beginning
of each season j due to labor market work. Combining equations (2.14) and (2.15), and
setting B = B, the farmer’s utility maximization problem can be written as:
max
c1;x1;c2;x2;B;S
u(c1; x1) + u(c2; x2) (2.23)
subject to pc1c1 + px1x1 + pc2c2 + px2x2 = M (2.24)
where pc1 ; p

x1
; pc2 , and p

x2
are p1; 1;
p1
1  , and
p1
p2(1 ) , respectively, and
M  p1y + wL1 + p1
p2(1  )wL2 +

1  p1(1 + r)
p2(1  )

B (2.25)
Note that pc1 ; p

x1
; pc2 , and p

x2
can be interpreted as shadow prices of c1; x1; c2, and x2, and
that M is the full income of the farmer for the whole year. Since the return to savings (in
the form of physical stocks of the staple good) is p2
p1
(1   ),5 the farmer’s full income can
be decomposed into three parts: income in season 1 (p1y+wL1+ B), the discounted value
of income in season 2 ( p1
p2(1 )wL2), and the discounted value of the repayment in season 2
( p1(1+r)
p2(1 )
B). Let P be a vector of shadow prices, then cj and xj (j = 1; 2) can be written as
a function of P and M.
Let qj be the amount of the staple good a farmer buys in season j. First, “sell low”
behavior (q1 < 0) is discussed. The amount of the staple good the farmer sells in season 1
5Due to equation (2.10), the farmer saves in the form of the staple good. One unit of money in season 1
is worth 1p1 units of the staple good, which is depreciated to
1
p1
(1   ) units of the staple good. This staple
good is worth p2p1 (1  ) in monetary terms.
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( q1) can be expressed as:
 q1 = y   S   c1
=
1
p1

x1(P;M)  ( B + wL1)
	
=
1
p1

x1(P;M) 
B + wL1
M
M

(2.26)
Equation (2.26) implies that “Sell low” behavior happens if the proportion of cash income
in season 1 ( B + wL1) to full income (M) is too low to satisfy consumption of the other
good in season 1 (x1(P;M)).
Next, “buy high” behavior (q2 > 0) is discussed. The amount of the staple good that
the farmer sells in season 2 (q2) can be expressed as:
q2 = c2(P;M)  (1  )S (2.27)
and S can be represented as:
S =
p1y + wL1 + B   x1(P;M)
p1
  c1(P;M)
=
1
p1

p1y + wL1 + B
M
M   C1(P;M)

(2.28)
where C1(P;M)  x1(P;M) + p1c1(P;M), that is, total consumption in season 1 in
monetary terms. Equations (2.27) and (2.28) imply that, if the proportion of income in
season 1 (p1y+wL1+ B) to full income (M) is so low that the farmer cannot store enough
of the staple good to satisfy the demand of consumption of the staple good in season 2
(c2(P;M)), then he or she will buy the staple good in season 2.
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In sum, the timing of the trade of the staple good depends on the timing of income,
whether it is in kind or not, and the financial capacity to borrow money. One thing to note
is that, regardless of the timing of the trading of the staple good - whether the farmer buys
the staple good at high prices or not, the shadow prices are identical across farmers because
they all have the same return to savings in the form of the staple good, which is p2
p1
(1  
).6 In other words, every farmer takes advantage of the highly profitable inter-temporal
price arbitrage of the staple good. This leads to a new question: Is the price increase
of the staple good in the hunger season really bad for farmers? To address this issue,
welfare analysis is conducted. Define the indirect utility function induced from the utility
maximization problem of this section as V (P;W ), and define (> 0) as the Lagrange
multiplier corresponding to equation (2.24), then the the following equation is derived by
applying the envelope theorem;
@V (P;M)
@p2
=

  p1
p22(1  )
wL2 +
p1(1 + r)
p22(1  )
B +
p1
p22(1  )
x2


= fx2 + (1 + r) B   wL2g
p1
p22(1  )
=  p2q2 p1
p22(1  )
=  q2 p1
p2(1  ) (2.29)
where x2  x2(P;M), given fixed (P,M). Since ; p1; p2 and 1   are strictly positive, and
q2 is the amount of the staple good a farmer buys in season 2, equation (2.29) indicates that
net buyers of the staple good in season 2 decrease their welfare by the increase of the price
of the staple good in season 2, while net sellers of the staple good in season 2 increase their
welfare by the increase of the staple good prices in season 2. This result emphasizes the
importance of policies to mitigate seasonal price changes, because poorer farmers are less
6If transaction costs are added to the model, the return to savings and shadow prices could be heteroge-
nous, depending on the trade patterns. See Appendix A for a further discussion.
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likely to have access to financial resources, and are more likely to purchase the staple good
in season 2. Mitigating seasonal price changes could reduce the gap between poor farmers
and rich farmers.
2.3.2 Diagramatic Representation
A diagram provides an intuitive explanation for “sell low, buy high” puzzle. To simplify
notation, define u(c1; x1) and u(c2; x2) as u1(c1; x1) and u2(c2; x2), respectively. Since
preferences over time are assumed to be additive, the farmer’s utility maximization problem
can be divided into two stages; at the first stage, expenditure is allocated to either season 1
or season 2, and at the second stage, expenditure in each season is allocated to the staple
good and other goods.7 Solving this maximization problem by backward induction, the
farmer’s demand at the second stage can be represented as cj(P;Mj) and xj(P;Mj) (j =
1; 2), where P is a vector of p1 and p2, and Mj is the expenditure in season j. Then, given
fixed P, the farmer’s utility to be maximized at the first stage can be written as;
u1(c1; x1) + u2(c2; x2) = u1(c1(P;M1); x1(P;M1)) + u2(c2(P;M2); x2(P;M2))
= U(M1;M2 j P ) (2.30)
Figure 2.1 illustrates the utility maximization problem of the farmer. The first quadrant
represents the decision making at the first stage, that is, total expenditure is allocated to
either season 1 or season 2. Its horizontal axis is for the expenditure in season 1 (M1), and
the vertical axis for the expenditure in season 2 (M2). OA, AB, BC, and OD represent wL1,
B, p1y, and wL2, respectively. This farmer borrows B in season 1 and repays (1 + r) B
in season 2, which is represented by DE in the diagram. OC represents the total money
the farmer can spend in season 1 without savings of the staple good, and OE represents
7See Chapter 5 in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for more details.
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the total money that the farmer can spend in season 2 without savings of the staple good.
Since this farmer can save the staple good from season 1 to season 2 with the return rate of
p2
p1
(1  ), GH represents the inter-seasonal budget constraint for this farmer with the slope
of p2
p1
(1   ). This farmer maximizes his or her utility U(M1;M2 j P ), given this budget
constraint. Note that the change of P changes the functional form of U(M1;M2 j P ), which
makes it difficult to conduct comparative statistics with respect to P on this diagram. As a
result of utility maximization, OJ represents total expenditure in season 1, and OI represents
total expenditure in season 2. Note that JC represents the amount of savings of the staple
good in monetary terms, that is, p1S. At the second stage of the utility maximization
problem, these total expenditures OJ and OI are allocated to the staple good and other
goods in each season. The fourth quadrant represents the decision making on the second
stage for season 1. The horizontal axis represents the amount of other goods consumed in
season 1 (x1), and the vertical axis represents the amount of the staple good consumes in
season 1 (c1). Since one unit of maize is worth p1 units of money, the slope of the budget
constraint (JK) is p1. The optimal amounts of c1 and x1 are determined to maximize a
contemporaneous utility function u1(c1; x1) given this budget constraint JK. As a result
of this utility maximization, OM represents the amount of the staple good consumed in
season 1 (c1) and OB represents the amount of other goods consumed in season 1 (x1).
LB represents the value of the staple good sold in season 1, that is,  p1q1 (so in fact, p1q1
is the amount of the staple good bought in season 1). If OL is bigger than OB, in other
words, if x1 is bigger than wL1 + B, the farmer sells the staple good in season 1.That is, if
total cash in hand other than the value of the staple food harvested, wL1 + B is less than
the demand for the other good in season 1 (x1), the farmer must sell some of the staple
good to purchase that other good. If OL is smaller than OB, the farmer buys the staple
food in season 1. And if OL=OB, the farmer neither buys nor sells the staple good. The
second quadrant represents the decision making on the second stage for season 2. The
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vertical axis represents the amount of other goods consumed in season 2 (x2), and the
horizontal axis represents the amount of the staple good consumed in season 2 (c2). Since
one unit of the staple good is worth p2 units of money, the slope of budget constraint (IN)
is p2. The optimal amounts of c2 and x2 are chosen to maximize a contemporaneous utility
function u2(c2; x2) given the budget constraint IN. As a result of this utility maximization,
OP represents the amount of the staple good consumed in season 2 (c2) and OQ represents
the amount of the other good consumed in season 2 (x2). EQ represents the value of the
staple good bought in season 2, that is, p2q2. If OQ is smaller than OE, the farmer sells the
staple good in season 2, and if OQ is bigger than OE, the farmer buys the staple good in
season 2 (so, it is the amount of the staple food bought in season 2). Figure 2.2 represents
the utility maximization problem of a farmer whose full income (GH) is identical to the
farmer represented in Figure 2.1, but whose timing of income is different: the amount of
the staple food harvested at the beginning of season 1 (y1) is greater, and cash income in
season 2 (wL2) is less. In this setting, the farmer buys the staple food in season 2 (OQ
is bigger than OE), but the amounts of the goods consumed in each season (c1; x1; c2 and
x2) are identical to those of the farmer in Figure 2.1. Obviously, whether the farmer sells
or buys the staple good at higher prices or lower prices (the sign of qt(t = 1; 2)) does not
change the slope of the diagram, that is, any farmer faces the same return to savings and
the same shadow prices. The determinants of the timing of trading the staple food are the
timing of income, whether it is in kind or not, the financial capacity to borrow money, and
the farmer’s preferences.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In settings where produced staple foods are used to smooth consumption of the staple good,
seasonal price changes could affect seasonal consumption patterns not only through income
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and substitution effects, but also through changing the return to savings. In this situation,
the reduced consumption in the hunger season in response to high prices at that time should
not be interpreted only as simple income and substitution effects. Rather, it could signal
an inability to reallocate resources across seasons. This implies that models of farmers’
savings should include saving in the form of stocks of agricultural output.
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Figure 1. Diagram for the Utility Maximization Problem 
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Figure 2.1: Diagram for the Utility Maximization Problem: “Buy High”
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Figure 2. Diagram for the Utility Maximization Problem: “Sell High” 
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Figure 2.2: Diagram for the Utility Maximization Problem: “Sell High”
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Chapter 3
The Seasonality of Food Insecurity in
Rural Zambia1
3.1 Introduction
Seasonality is an important aspect of food security for subsistence farmers in developing
countries. Farmers receive agricultural income only at the harvest season, and it is uncer-
tain. Their previous year’s harvest stocks gradually dwindle, and some farmers run out of
their food before the next harvest. Such farmers need to buy their food with cash, but food
prices are usually high right before the next harvest. Those farmers who run out of food and
buy their food when prices are high cannot buy an adequate amount of food. Most malnu-
trition and deaths of young children occur in those periods (e.g. Devereux et al, 2012), and
so do famines (e.g. Sen, 1981). Those periods are often referred to as the hunger season
(e.g. Devereux et al., 2012, Vaitla et al., 2009, and Khandker and Mahmud., 2012).
To cope with income seasonality and instability due to the agricultural cycle, farmers
1This chapter is co-authored with Takeshi Sakurai.
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smooth their consumption by relying on borrowing or savings (e.g. Paxson, 1992), or by en-
tering into informal risk sharing arrangements (e.g. Townsend, 1994). However, when such
mechanisms do not function well (e.g. incomplete credit markets, insufficient risk sharing
networks, and so on), farmers are unable to achieve perfect consumption smoothing, and
may reduce their food consumption during the time just before they receive their harvest
income.2 Thus, seasonality of food insecurity can be seen as a consequence of farmers’
inability to smooth food consumption in that season. This paper addresses whether, and
how, farmers in rural Zambia smooth their consumption within a crop year.
Several previous studies have addressed this issue by testing whether seasonal con-
sumption tracks seasonal income patterns, but their results are somewhat mixed. Paxson
(1993) and Chaudhuri and Paxon (2002) found no evidence that seasonal consumption
tracks seasonal income patterns in Thailand and India, respectively, while Dercon and Kr-
ishnan (2000) and Khandker (2012) showed that seasonal income affects seasonal con-
sumption in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, respectively. These studies implicitly assume that
each farmer’s ability to smooth consumption is identical. However, as Jalan and Ravallion
(1999) showed, poorer farmers are more likely to fail consumption smoothing, which casts
doubt on the validity of this assumption. This paper focuses on heterogeneity in the ability
to smooth consumption.
This paper also contributes to two additional threads of the consumption smoothing
literature. One is related to the more conventional consumption smoothing literature,
which uses annual household consumption data to test whether, and to what extent, farmers
smooth their consumption (e.g. Paxson, 1992; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion and Chaudhuri,
1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003, and Kurosaki, 2001, 2006). They examine the impact
2Fafchamps (2003) and Dercon (2005) provide comprehensive surveys of this literature.
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of income shocks on consumption, usually measured as annual average consumption or
average consumption during the time just before the survey was conducted. However, the
impact could be relatively large or small during certain seasons of the year. Therefore,
this paper traces how the impact of agricultural harvest shocks on consumption varies over
time during the year. The other thread is a growing literature which evaluates the impact
of seasonal credit programs that aim to counter seasonal price increases of staple foods
during the hunger season. These studies have addressed the impacts of such programs not
only on total consumption but also on consumption of staple foods, non-food expenditure,
and a health index (Basu and Wong, 2015), local prices of staple foods (Burke, 2014), and
the allocation of household labor and local farming wages (Fink, Jack and Maiye, 2014).
But food diversity is also important for food security, because lack of food diversity could
result in micronutrient deficiencies. In Zambia, the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency in
2003 was 53.3% for children and 13.4% for women of child-bearing age (National Food
Nutrition Committee of Zambia, 2011), and this increases the risk of disease and death
from severe infections. Thus, this paper pays special attention to how farmers adjust their
consumption of non-staple foods in response to harvest shocks.3
Using three years of weekly household panel data collected in the southern part of Zam-
bia, and two retrospective household surveys that collected data on the trading patterns of
maize and crop harvests of the sampled households in each year, this paper estimates de-
mand functions to examine whether, and to what extent, harvest shocks affect consumption
and, if so, how the impacts persist over time. The estimation method pays careful attention
to heterogenous timing of purchases of the staple food, maize. The farmers in the study
area grow maize for self-consumption. If their maize yields are not enough for their annual
3The farmers’ consumption of non-staple foods includes a variety of local foods for which nutrient ta-
bles are not available. Thus, we could not calculate their intakes of specific micronutrients to test whether
consumption of them is smoothed during the hunger season.
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consumption, they must buy maize. Given seasonal price changes of maize, some farm-
ers buy maize when prices are low and store it for the hunger season; these farmers will
henceforth be called NBH (not buy high) farmers. In contrast, other farmers run out of
maize and so engage in off-farm work to obtain cash to buy maize when prices are high;
these farmers will be called BH (buy high) farmers. These differences indicate heterogene-
ity across farmers in their ability to smooth consumption. To investigate this phenomena,
demand functions are estimated separately for both types of farmers. To see how farmers
adjust their composition of consumption, this paper uses as dependent variables of these
demand functions not only total consumption but also consumption of the staple food, of
other foods, and of non-food items.
Regression results suggest that NBH farmers successfully smooth their consumption.
In contrast, BH farmers reduce total consumption after the harvest in response to harvest
shocks, and the shocks produce an inverse U consumption pattern during the crop year,
especially for farmers with little assets. One reason that they do not recover from harvest
shocks is that they have difficulties smoothing their consumption through off-farm labor;
since maize prices increase while they work, their incomes in real terms decrease as maize
prices increase. Looking into how BH farmers adjust the composition of their consumption,
they almost smooth consumption of staple foods despite the seasonal hike in maize prices.
However, they decrease consumption of non-staple food items, such as vegetables and
meats. This result suggests that the policies to improve food diversity should be included
in discussions of policies to help farmers cope with seasonal price changes of the staple
food.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data from
the household survey. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategies, and Section 4 provides
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the estimation results. Section 5 discusses policy implications and concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Survey Outline
The household survey data used in this paper were collected as part of the Resilience Project
- Vulnerability and Resilience of Social-Ecological Systems, administered as part of a
collaboration among the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN), the Inter-
University Research Institute Corporation, and the National Institutes for the Humanities,
all of which are in Japan. The study area is located in Choma and Sinazongwe Districts,
in the Southern Province of Zambia, and data were collected from three ecological zones:
Site A (the lower flat land zone near Lake Kariba), Site B (the middle slope zone), and
Site C (the upper land zone on the plateau). These three sites are located within a radius of
15 kilometers, but cover a wide diversity of agricultural ecosystems. Annual rainfall and
natural vegetation are different due to the variation in altitude, but the ethnicity and culture
of the local populations are the same across the survey sites. From each site, 16 households
were chosen randomly, so the total sample size is 47.4 More information on the survey is
found in Sakurai (2008).
The household survey was conducted from November 2007 to December 2011, and it
consists of an annual household survey, a monthly household survey, and a weekly house-
hold survey. The weekly household survey collected detailed data on consumption. This
chapter uses data for three crop years.5 Moreover, in September 2010, additional retrospec-
4One household was dropped because it moved away.
5The data used are from May, 2008 to April, 2011. We define the crop year 08/09 as the 12 months from
May, 2008 to April, 2009, the crop year 09/10 from May 2009 to April 2010, and the crop year 10/11 from
May 2010 to April 2011. The data from November 2007 to April 2008 are not used because there are no data
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tive data were collected on the crop yields in the harvest seasons (April or May) of 2008,
2009 and 2010. For each plot, for each year, farmers were also asked about planted crops,
and asked to rate their crop yields using three categories - above average, average, and
below average. To evaluate the farmers’ relative value of each plot, they were asked each
plot’s rental cost. In addition, in March 2011, farmers were interviewed to collect data on
their maize purchases from the beginning of the research period, and those who purchased
maize were asked when, how often, and the amounts they purchased at each time.
3.2.2 Seasonal Patterns of Income and Consumption
In the study area, almost all the villagers are subsistence farmers whose main income source
is agricultural production. All the sampled households are farmers who grow their staple
food, maize, for self-consumption and, if their harvests exceed their annual consumption,
for sale. If their maize production is insufficient for their annual consumption, farmers buy
maize with cash. Farmers plant seeds once it starts raining, typically in November, and
harvest from March to May. This period of time is the rainy season. After the harvest, the
dry season starts and there is almost no rain. Throughout the year, but mainly during the dry
season, farmers engage in various types of on-farm or off-farm work. Farmers who have
fields near the river cultivate a second crop during the dry season, typically from June to
November. Table 3.1 shows the number of households who grow maize in the dry season.
In the study area, 22 households (6 in Site A, 4 in Site B, and 12 in Site C) have fields
near the river. In addition, the sample households can engage in a variety of off-farm work
activities to obtain cash. The major way to obtain cash in Site A is to work at a fisheries
company at Lake Kariba. In Site B, production and trade of lumber is a major work activity,
and in Site C, growing food crops for trade, such as double cropping maize and vegetables,
on crop harvest for that year. The data from May 2011 to December 2011 are not used because there are no
data regarding maize trading patterns in those periods.
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is important. Other types of piece work, such as the selling handicraft products by a female
household member, are also a major source of cash in all three sites. In this way, every
household engages in some kind of wage or self-employment work during the dry season.
The typical meal of a farmer’s family consists of Nsima (a very thick porridge made
from maize flour) and one or two side dishes. Side dishes are usually seasonal vegetables
(e.g. cabbage, tomato, onion, okra, pumpkin leaves, mushroom, and so on) sauteed in
oil and salt, which is an important source of micronutrients, such as vitamin A and zinc.
Their main source of protein is kapenta (dried small fish), which is sometimes added to the
sauteed vegetables. Only on very special days, meats are added to the side dish. For exam-
ple, many households celebrate Christmas, and eat chicken or goat on that day. Figure 3.1
shows the average composition of values of consumption per week per adult-equivalent6
over the three years of data collection, calculated based on the weekly household survey
data. Food consumption accounts for 83% of their total consumption, almost half of which
is for staple foods, which is primarily maize. The other half of food consumption is for veg-
etables and fruits, animal products, and processed food products, which is mainly for side
dishes.7 Of course, agricultural inputs such as fertilizers or seeds are excluded from these
estimates of household consumption. Figure 3.2 shows seasonal patterns of average total
(food and non-food) consumption per week per adult-equivalent, and Figure 3.3 presents
seasonal patterns of average consumption for staple foods, other foods, and non-food items.
The spike of consumption of non-staple foods in December is due to Christmas. Although
non-food items account for only 17% of the value of these households’ total consumption,
6Adult-equivalent scales are adopted from the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey reports published
by the Central Statistics Office, Zambia. For each household, the number of adult equivalents is defined as:
(Number of adult males) + (Number of adult females) + (Number of children (10-12 years)) * 0.76 + (Number
of children (7-9 years)) * 0.78+ (Number of children (4-6 years)) * 0.62 + (Number of children (0-3 years))
* 0.36. Adults are defined as above 12 years old.
7Cooking oil and salt are categorized as processed food products.
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their consumption is relatively concentrated just after harvest, that is, in May, June and
July. The main reason for this trend is that these are purchases of household goods such as
clothes and kitchen utensils, and these households tend to purchase these household goods
just after the harvest.
3.2.3 Seasonal Price Changes and the Way Farmers Buy Maize
Figure 3.4 shows average maize prices per bucket8 over the three crop years, and Figure
3.5 shows average maize prices per bucket for each crop year. In each crop year, maize
prices are cheapest after the harvest season, and gradually increase until next harvest sea-
son. Compared with the lowest prices in each crop year, peak prices increased by 86%,
69%, and 29% in crop years 08/09, 09/10, and 10/11, respectively.9 Given these seasonal
price changes, it is profitable for households to buy maize when maize prices are low and
sell when maize prices are higher. However, only a few villagers sell maize in the hunger
season, when maize prices are high, and thereby practice an inter-seasonal price arbitrage.10
Possible reasons for not doing this would be high transaction costs for selling maize in the
hunger season, and incomplete credit markets. One particularly important source of trans-
action costs for selling maize during the hunger season is social pressure. In the study
villages, it is a common custom that farmers with surplus maize in the hunger season give
some of their maize to neighboring farmers in bad situations. Thus, in order to practice
an inter-seasonal price arbitrage of maize, farmers first need to secure enough maize to
distribute to other, poorer farmers. Another source of transaction costs for selling maize in
8In the study area, a bucket is a standard unit in the market. One bucket of maize is a bucket filled with
maize (about 15.5kg), and the bucket size is standardized in the study area.
9Note that this number is in real terms, that is, deflated by the GDP deflater, which is about 12% during
the year. Peak prices highly depend on crop situations around the study area in each year.
10As far as we know, in our study area, only one villager, who obviously had a large amount of capital,
practiced such inter-temporal price arbitrage, and he was not one of our sample households. There are some
outside inter-village traders, called briefcase businessman, who practice such inter-temporal price arbitrage.
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the hunger season is fixed costs for storage. Since farmers do not have additional storage
capacity for inter-temporal price arbitrage, they need to invest in additional storage capac-
ity. Finally, there is the opportunity cost of trading maize during the hunger season, which
can be considered to be a transaction cost because this time of year is the agricultural busy
season and thus the marginal cost of labor is high. In combination, these transaction costs
appear to prevent farmers from selling maize in the hunger season.
On the maize purchasing side, Table 3.2 presents data on households by their purchase
patterns for maize. Over three crop years, slightly less than half (68) of the 141 household
year observation had purchases of maize, and there are two distinct patterns for these maize
purchases. One is purchases of maize from May to December, and almost all of these
observations consist of only one or two purchases. These are situations where households
bought maize relatively soon after the harvest, when maize prices are low, and stored them
for the hunger season. The other group of observations is of households who purchased
maize from January to April (many also purchased maize before January), and almost all
of them bought maize more than three times. They bought maize frequently, because they
repeated a cycle in which they worked until they had enough money to buy some units
of maize (for example, one bucket of maize), and then purchased the maize, and repeated
this several times. This is likely to be a cycle of every week, every 15 days, or every
month. The three possible reasons for why some farmers bought maize at high prices
include incomplete credit markets, impatience or lack of storage. However, lack of storage
seems not to be the case in the study area, because every household has enough storage for
annual consumption (direct observation by the author). Impatience also seems unlikely to
explain this behavior, because the increase in the price of maize from the lowest season to
the highest season is very high, ranging from 29% to 86% after deflating using Zambia’s
GDP deflater, which is much higher than any plausible discount rate for future utility. Thus,
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incomplete credit markets appear to be the most likely reason that households buy maize
when prices are high.
3.3 Empirical Framework
3.3.1 The Consumption Equation
The theoretical model in Appendix A shows that incomplete credit markets and high trans-
action costs of maize selling in the hunger season, combined with seasonal price changes
of maize, will affect seasonal consumption differently for those farmers who did not buy
maize at higher prices during the crop year (NBH farmers) relative to those farmers who
bought maize at higher prices (BH farmers). This is because high prices of the staple food
just before harvest can be viewed as a (potentially) high return to savings for BH farmers,
or more accurately, a high opportunity cost of not saving, but not for NBH farmers.11 In
particular, the ability of farmers to smooth consumption is likely to be different for BH
and NBH farmers, because BH farmers buy maize at higher prices than NBH farmers by
using cash income from off-farm labor. Thus, this paper estimates seasonal consumption
separately for NBH and BH farmers. See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion.
To examine whether, and to what extent, harvest shocks affect consumption, and how
these effects persist over time, the following demand function is estimated separately for
11High prices of the staple food just before harvest cannot be viewed as a high return to savings for NBH
farmers, because they save enough maize for self-consumption and need to pay high transaction costs if they
want to sell maize at high prices. This is explained in detail in Appendix A, which explains that NBH farmers
are not influenced by p2 (the price during the hunger season)
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BH and NBH farmers:
Cjimyw =
3X
y=1
12X
m=1
jmy Dmy +
12X
m=1
jmTIiy Dm + jXimy + jvy + ji + ujiymw
for j = NBH;BH
(3.1)
where Cjiymw is consumption of household i in village v in (crop) year y in month m in
week w, and superscript j is BH or NBH. Dmy is a dummy variable that equals one if
the month is m and the year is y, and 0 otherwise, and the term jmy captures average
seasonal consumption patterns in each year. Note that the sequence of maize prices in each
year affects seasonal consumption patterns in that year. These seasonal price effects are
captured by (jmy for m = 1;    ; 12).12 Dm is a dummy variable that equals one if the
month is m, and 0 otherwise, and TIiy is the harvest shock that household i suffered at the
beginning of the crop year y.13 Ximy is a vector of time-varying household variables, jvy
is unobserved year varying village fixed effects, ji is household fixed effects, and u
j
iymw is
an error term that has an expected value of zero.
The coefficients jm capture the impact of harvest shocks on consumption in each
month, and are the parameters of interest. If the farmer successfully smooths consump-
tion both across years and within a crop year, all the jm coefficients should be zero. If
the farmer cannot smooth consumption across years, but can smooth consumption within
12Since the study villages are located within a radius of 15 kilometers, maize prices are assumed to be
identical for all the sample households. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, there are two
distinctive groups with different crop patterns in the study area: one group whose members have their own
fields near the river and so can grow maize in the off-farm season, and the other group whose members do not.
To allow for different seasonal consumption patterns by different cropping patterns, seasonal consumption
patterns are allowed to differ for different cropping patterns.
13Income shocks in the middle of the year are not included in equation (3.1). This is discussed in the
following subsection.
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years, then the jm coefficients will be negative but will be equal across months. However,
if this failure to smooth consumption across years is due to village level income shocks,
year varying village fixed effects will control for this and all mj coefficients will equal
zero. In this case, inability to smooth consumption within a crop year will results in some
jm coefficients being negative. If the farmer fails to smooth consumption, jm coefficients
should be negative for at least one month, and how farmers adjust their consumption during
the year is discussed.
3.3.2 Identification
OLS estimation for equation (3.1) is likely to lead to biased estimates of jm because, in
general, there will be sample selection bias due to correlation between ujiymw and I
j
iy, that
is,
E[ujiymw j jm; T Iiy; Dm; Ximy; Ijiy] 6= 0 for j = NBH;BH (3.2)
where IBHiy (INBHiy ) is a dummy variable that equals one if household i was a BH farmer
in year y (or a NBH farmer in year y). Whether a farmer becomes a BH farmer or a
NBH farmer in each year (Ijiy) depends on assets and on borrowing abilities, which allow
the farmer to buy maize when maize prices are low. Yet, these factors could also affect
consumption (Cjiymw) through the error term (ujiymw). These factors can be considered as
household specific characteristics, so household fixed effects are added to equation (3.1). In
addition, to control for any village level shocks, year varying village fixed effects are also
added. Error terms are clustered at the household level which are robust to heteroscedastic-
ity of unknown form. To see how this identification strategy is plausible for identifying the
causal impact of harvest shocks on seasonal consumption, consider three sources of sta-
tistical endogeneity in turn: unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality, and measurement
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error. Special attention is given to unobserved heterogeneity caused by sample selection
that leads some farmers to be NBH farmers and others to be BH farmers.
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to the problem of omitted variables that are correlated
with both seasonal consumption and any of the regressors in equation (3.1). Fortunately,
household fixed effects control for this bias as long as the unobservable factors which deter-
mine both Ijiy and C
j
iymw are invariant across years within the same household. However, if
such determinants vary across years, household fixed effects are not enough to avoid bias.
This could happen if households’ ability to raise funds, such as asset holdings, varies over
time. In that case, year-variant household fixed effects are required. However, one draw-
back of the year-variant household fixed effects estimation is that year variant household
fixed effects make it impossible to estimate jm for all m, because the cross-terms TIiy Dm
(m = 1;    ; 12) and year variant household fixed effects are linearly dependent. Thus,
one of those cross-terms for some base month should be dropped from the model (in this
paper, May), and all that one can estimate are the differences of coefficient from May, that
is, (jm   j5). In this paper, estimation results without year variant household fixed effects
are used to interpret the results, and as robustness checks, the results are compared to es-
timation results with year variant household fixed effects to see the extent to which these
two estimators are different. But still, if some unobservables which are not captured even
by year variant household fixed effects are correlated with both Ijiy and Ciymw, estimation
results will be biased. One possible source of this bias is large income shocks in the middle
of the year. If a household that was going to purchase maize in the middle of the year, prices
were relatively low suffered income shocks, and put off purchases of maize, this income
shock can cause bias. Or, if a double cropping household who was not supposed to pur-
chase maize when maize prices are high had a failure of dry season maize and purchased
maize, this harvest shock causes bias. Since there are no data on such income shocks, this
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possibility cannot be ruled out. However, this is unlikely to be a serious problem, because
off-farm work in the study area is relatively stable compared to the rain-fed harvest in May.
Fishery companies at Lake Kariba provide many stable employment opportunities in site
A, and a high demand of lumber to build ships for them provides a stable supply market for
the producers and traders of lumber in site B. The harvest of dry season maize in site C is
also relatively stable, because this harvest does not depend on rainfall, but on water coming
from the river near their fields.
Another regressor that should receive careful attention is the TIiy variable, which rep-
resents harvest shocks. For this variable, the survey data collected in September 2010,
which include retrospective data on income shocks, are used. For each plot in each year,
households were asked whether each plot was fallow in that year. If not fallow, a general
indicator crop yield of each plot was asked, using a simple scale of “above average”, “av-
erage” or “below average”. The reasons for being “below average” are categorized into: 1.
heavy rain: 2. lack of seed; 3. lack of fertilizer: or 4. other reasons. In addition, for each
plot, rental costs were asked to evaluate the relative value of each plot. Note that since the
land market is incomplete, rental costs are subjective.14 By using these data, the fraction
of the value of plots that are below average due to other reasons divided by the total value
of the land is calculated for each household in each year, and used as a proxy for harvest
shocks. For example, if the farmer has three plots with rental costs of 300ZMK, 500ZMK,
and 200ZMK, and whose crop situations are below average due to insects (which would
be included as “other reasons” in the data), average, and below average due to the lack of
fertilizer, respectively, the proxy is 0:3 = 300=(300 + 500 + 200). The fraction of “below
average due to lack of seed, or lack of fertilizer” is excluded from the proxy, because these
phenomena could reflect the farmer’s farm management decisions in the previous year,
14But as long as relative rental costs are not affected by subjectivity, then this is not a problem.
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which could be correlated with farmers’ other decisions in the previous year that affect
consumption of the following year (e.g. off-farm labor supply). The fraction of “below
average due to heavy rain” is not included, because the impact of heavy rain is absorbed in
year variant village fixed effects.15
Reverse causality refers to the statistical endogeneity problem that arises from the fact
that the dependent variable might have causal impact on the explanatory variable of in-
terest. This problem could arise if seasonal consumption affects harvest shocks. In fact,
consumption decisions after the harvest cannot affect harvest shocks, because these harvest
shocks happen at the beginning of the crop year, and consumption is decided after that.
A final endogeneity problem arises from measurement error. The variable indicating
whether the farmer bought maize at higher prices or not (Ijiy) is highly unlikely to be a
problem in our application given that this should be easy to remember and there is no ob-
vious advantage or disadvantage to misreporting it. In addition, respondents were not only
asked the timing of their maize trade, but also asked some other associated questions, such
as the frequency of trade and its volume, which would remind respondents of the situation
at that time and would minimize their errors. To allow for the possibility that the adult
equivalence scales use may cause measurement errors in consumption, demand functions
are also estimated without equivalence scales to check for robustness (see Appendix B).
15Two noteworthy income shocks that occurred during the study period are heavy rains in December 2007
and in February 2010. These heavy rains ruined or even washed away maize fields, and decreased house-
holds’ transitory income in crop years 08/09 and 10/11. The impact of these heavy rains varied according
to geographical conditions. Since differences of geographical condition almost correspond to village classi-
fication, year variant village fixed effects capture village level income shocks caused by heavy rains. Note
that, in this village classification, Site B is divided into two areas, because the geomorphological feature and
soil conditions of these two areas are different. Heterogenous impacts of heavy rain among households are
captured by year variant household fixed effects, which are included in some robustness check estimations.
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In sum, although it is definitely possible that there remain some sources of bias that can
undo the proposed identification of a causal effect, this identification strategy has ruled out
a number of sources of bias, and it minimizes bias from other sources as much as possible
given the available data. Especially, compared to the conventional strategies which fix the
sample selection bias by specifying a selection equation (e.g. Heckman, 1976, Wooldridge,
1995, and Kyriazidou, 1997), the identification strategy using household fixed effects used
in this paper has the strength that it does not need to find variables which appear with a
non-zero coefficient in a selection equation but do not appear in the equation of interest. In
addition, the strategy does not require any assumption on the functional form of the error
term.
3.3.3 Definitions of Variables
The main dependent variable is the value of total consumption per week per adult-equivalent,
normalized by its simple sample average over three years, which is ciwmy c where c repre-
sents a simple arithmetic average of ciwmy. Also of interest are micronutrient deficiencies,
especially for infants, young children aged 6-24 months and women of child-bearing age,
since such deficiencies are an acute problem in Zambia. To account for micronutrient
deficiencies, total consumption is divided into staple foods, other foods (almost always
corresponding to side dishes of their diet) and non-food items, and demand functions for
each set of goods are estimated. This is done to focus on the demand for other foods,
because those foods are the most important source of many micronutrients. Farmers who
buy maize at higher prices are defined as the farmers who bought maize after December,
because distinctive patterns for their maize purchases can be seen for them, as shown in
Table 3.2. Summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the demand functions are
reported in Table 3.3.
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3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Main Results
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the estimated parameters jm in equation (3.1), in which the depen-
dent variable is total consumption (Table 3.4), and its components, that is staple food, other
food, and non-food (Table 3.5).16 Recall that, if the farmer successfully smooths consump-
tion within a crop year, all the jm coefficients should be zero. If the farmer fails to smooth
consumption, jm coefficients should be negative at least for one month. If deviations from
consumption smoothing are found, how farmers adjust their consumption during the year
is discussed. Recall as well that most households harvest in April and May, and that the
value of total consumption per week per adult-equivalent is normalized by its sample av-
erage over three years. The coefficients can be interpreted as the changes in the value of
consumption per week per adult equivalent (compared to sample average over three years)
when all of their plots are “below average”.17 In addition, to see how sensitivity to income
shocks differs depending on asset holdings, interaction terms of harvest shocks and num-
ber of cattle are added in each month. In this case, coefficients of the intersection terms
of harvest shocks and month dummy are interpreted as income sensitivities for the farmers
with no cattle, and coefficients on the intersection terms for harvest shocks, month dummy,
and the number of cattle are interpreted as the marginal impact of one cattle on income
sensitivities. Test results for the null hypothesis that (i) all the  coefficients of intersection
terms of the income shock and the month dummies are zero; and that (ii) all the coefficients
of intersection terms of the income shock, the month dummies, and the number of cattle
are zero; are reported at the bottom of the Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Figure 3.6 reports confidence
16The estimated results including all other control variables are reported in Appendix B.
17For example, consider the BH group in May. The coefficient for total consumption is -0.363. This
implies that, if 10% of the plot of the BH farmer is below average, the total consumption per week per adult
equivalent decreases 3.63% of total consumption of sample average.
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intervals at 95% level for the coefficients of the intersection terms of the income shock and
month dummies.
The first column of Table 3.4 shows the results using all sample households together.
The null hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the interaction terms of income shock and
month dummy are zero cannot be rejected. To see how such income sensitivities differ for
NBH farmers and BH farmers, all other columns in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the results of
separate estimations for NBH farmers and BH farmers. Of the 47 farmers in the sample,
26 were NBH farmers in all three years, 3 were BH farmers in all three years, 18 were
NBH farmers in one or two years, and BH farmers in the other years. For this last group
of farmers, the seasons when they were BH are included in the BH group and the seasons
when they were NBH are included in the NBH group.
NBH farmers: The Farmer Who Does Not Buy Maize at Higher Prices
The second column of Table 3.4 presents results for the seasons when farmers did not “buy
high” (NBH farmers). None of the coefficients is significant, and neither are they jointly
significant. In addition, looking at the fourth column of Table 3.4, even NBH farmers
with no cattle do not decrease their consumption in response to harvest shocks.18 These
results indicate that farmers who do not buy maize at higher prices successfully smooth
their consumption during a crop year, regardless of their wealth status. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that they smooth total consumption by adjusting the composition of their
consumption. This is seen by looking at Table 3.5 (a); no coefficients of the interaction
terms between the income shock and the month dummy variable are significant.
18The coefficients of intersection terms of the income shock, the month dummies, and the number of cattle
are jointly significant, but almost all the coefficients are insignificant, and they are not very large.
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BH farmers: The Farmer Who Buys Maize at Higher Prices
The third column of Table 3.4 shows that BH farmers reduce total consumption throughout
the crop year in response to income shocks, especially just after the harvest and during the
“hunger season” just before the next harvest. In addition, the fifth column of Table 3.4 ex-
hibits some role of household assets to smooth consumption; the coefficients of interaction
terms of the income shock, the month dummies, and the number of cattle are significant
in February and in March. These results indicate that farmers who buy maize at higher
prices are unable to achieve perfect consumption smoothing, regardless of their wealth sta-
tus, but that they can mitigate the impacts of negative harvest shocks in the hunger season,
as household assets increase. Note also that the size of the impact of harvest shocks is
not negligible. For example, the coefficient of harvest shocks in March is -0.418, which is
significant at the 1 % level. This means that, if 10% of these farmers’ land suffers from a
below average harvest, they decrease their consumption by 4.2% of the sample average of
total consumption.
Although the farmers in the BH group decrease their total consumption in response to
harvest shocks, they almost smooth their consumption of staple foods, in spite of the sea-
sonal price hike for maize. This is seen by looking at the first column of Table 3.5(b); only
the coefficient in February is significant.19 In addition, the fourth column of Table 3.5(b)
shows that the negative coefficient in February is mitigated as household assets increase. In
contrast, these farmers reduce consumption of other food at a non-negligible level through-
out the year. For example, the coefficient of harvest shocks in March is -0.683, which is
significant at the 1 % level. This means that, if 10% of these farmers’ land suffers from
19The coefficients of intersection terms of the income shock and the month dummies are jointly significant.
In addition, the coefficients in March and in April are negative with relatively small standard errors, although
these are insignificant. These results indicate that BH farmers may also slightly decrease their consumption
of staple foods throughout the hunger season.
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a below average harvest, they decrease their consumption of other food by 6.83% of the
sample average. The fifth column of Table 3.5(b) shows that, for BH farmers with more
assets, these shocks are mitigated mainly during the latter half of the crop year. Note that
these other foods generally correspond to the side dishes of their diet, which are important
sources of their micronutrients. Even if the farmers in this group suffer income shocks,
they sustain their consumption of staple foods by purchasing maize at higher prices. To do
so, they decrease their consumption of other foods. Thus, one dimension of income shocks,
that is often overlooked, is food diversity, which could change over time with a crop year
due to seasonal price changes of the staple food.
Lastly, consider the non-food items. BH households significantly decrease their con-
sumption in June, July, and August, but do not decrease after August. These results are
reasonable, considering that households in the study area tend to purchase non-food house-
hold goods such as clothes and kitchen utensils just after the harvest, and that most of
these other goods consist of daily necessities that can be stored over the crop year, such as
candles or soap.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
As discussed in the subsection on identification, adding household fixed effects may not
be sufficient to control for selection bias, and year-varying household fixed effects may
be required. However, since year-varying household fixed effects prevent identification
of one of jm parameters, it is useful to compare estimation results with and without year
varying household fixed effects are to see whether the within-year consumption patterns
are comparable. If they are comparable, then the restriction that household fixed effects do
not vary over years is not driving the within-year consumption patterns. Table 3.6 reports
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both estimation results, where “HH” indicates household fixed effects that do not vary over
years, and “YHH” indicates year-varying household fixed effects, and “dif” is the within
crop-year difference, which represents the differences of each coefficient from the May
coefficient, that is, (jm   j5).20 Thus, columns “dif” and “YHH” are compared. These
differences indicate that most estimates are similar and comove, so that there is no reason
to doubt the patterns found in the results that use household fixed effects that do not change
over years.
Another robustness check considers the possibility that use of the adult equivalent scales
may cause measurement errors in consumption. To check the robustness of these results,
demand functions are estimated without equivalent scales (each household member has a
weight equal to 1). The estimation results are reported in Appendix Table C.2. It shows
that no coefficients of the interaction terms of the income shock and the month dummies
are significant for NBH farmers. In contrast, the farmers in the BH group decrease their
total consumption in response to harvest shocks, and in particular, they reduce consumption
of other food. These results are consistent with the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 which use
the adult equivalent scales, and thus they indicate that the estimation results are robust to
different types of scaling.
3.4.3 Limitations
Despite their robustness, it is worth noting a limitation of this study’s external validity.
Although the sample households were chosen by using a well-organized two-stage cluster
sampling scheme (Sakurai, 2008), external validity is limited because the sample consists
of only in three villages, due to budget limitations. A related point is that these small
20The estimated results including all other control variables are reported in Appendix Table C.1.
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variations across households (due to their similarities within villages and across the three
villages) allow one to utilize variations only within each group of farmers (NBH farmers
and BH farmers), and it is not possible to take advantage of variations across each group
of farmers, which prevents an analysis of why some farmers buy maize at higher prices in
some years while other farmers do not. Thus, future collection of seasonal household data
should be collected on a larger scale.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Using three years of weekly household panel data collected in rural Zambia, this paper has
analyzed seasonality of food insecurity in rural Zambia by examining whether, and to what
extent, harvest shocks affect consumption patterns during the crop year. When faced with
seasonal price changes of the staple food, some farmers buy it when prices are low and
store enough for consumption during the hunger season (NBH farmers), while others do
not store enough and so run out of the staple food, and so they buy it when prices are high
(BH farmers). Results indicate that NBH farmers successfully smooth their consumption
over the 12 months of the crop year. In contrast, BH farmers reduce total consumption
in response to harvest shocks, and the shocks produce an inverse U consumption pattern
during the year, especially for farmers with few assets. Looking into the composition of
their consumption, BH farmers almost smooth tjeor consumption of staple foods, in spite
of the seasonal price hike of maize. Instead, they decrease consumption of non-staple food
items, such as vegetables and meats.
Heterogenous results between BH farmers and NBH farmers have important implica-
tions for poverty programs that offer short-term credit, because it relates to farmers’ het-
erogenous motivations for using credit programs. BH farmers are those who were unable to
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purchase sufficient amounts of maize when prices were low, and the results in this chapter
indicate that they are unable to smooth their consumption within any given year. Consid-
ering the extremely high maize prices in the hunger season, the impacts of the availability
of the credit for consumption smoothing to mitigate the impact of price increases during
the hunger season should be large, and BH farmers would want to have access to such
short-term credit rather than, or in addition to, credit for investment. On the other hand,
NBH farmers are those who are able to cope with the negative impacts of such price in-
creases in the hunger season by purchasing sufficient maize when maize prices are low, and
these results indicate that they successfully smooth consumption. Such farmers likely still
want access to credit, not for consumption smoothing, but for other purposes such as long-
term investments. Optimal schemes, repayment terms, and the timing of offers of credit
programs should differ depending on different motivations for using such programs, and
different credit programs should be designed to suit the purposes of each group of farmers.
The results in this chapter are also important because of the link between high prices of
staple foods in the hunger season and mirconutrient deficiencies, which have been deemed
a high priority by policy makers (e.g. National Food Nutrition Committee of Zambia, 2011,
FAO, 2016). For BH farmers, price increases of staple foods in the hunger season decrease
their welfare by decreasing their full income. However, in spite of this, consumption of
staple foods is generally insensitive to harvest shocks. Instead, they reduce consumption
only of non-staple food items, such as vegetables and meats. These results indicate that
such farmers reduce food diversity to smooth consumption of staple foods. Thus, mirconu-
trient deficiency problems should be part of any discussion of the problem of seasonal price
changes of staple foods.
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staples
38%
vegetables
21%
meat and fish
14%
processed
10%
nonfood
17%
(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
* Percentages are based on average total consumption per week per adult-equivalent, which
are in ZMK deflated by a monthly price index (=1 for November 2007)
Figure 3.1: Average Composition of Consumption Values of Consumption over 3 Years
(real terms)
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(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
* Average total (food and non-food) consumption per week per adult-equivalent. Numbers
are in ZMK deflated by a monthly price index (=1 for November 2007)
Figure 3.2: Seasonal Patterns of Average Consumption over 3 years
47
01000
2000
3000
4000
5000
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4
ZM
K
month
Staple Food Other Food Non-Food
(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
* Average total consumption per week per adult-equivalent. Numbers are in ZMK deflated
by a monthly price index (=1 as November 2007)
Figure 3.3: Seasonal Patterns of Average Consumption over 3 years
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(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
* Numbers are in ZMK deflated by a monthly price index (=1 for November 2007)
Figure 3.4: Seasonal Patterns of Average Maize Price Per Bucket, over 3 years
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(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
* Numbers are in ZMK deflated by a monthly price index (=1 for November 2007)
Figure 3.5: Seasonal Patterns of Average Maize Price Per Bucket by crop year
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Figure 6. Coefficients of Harvest shock 
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Figure 3.6: Coefficients of Harvest shock
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Figure 3.6. Coefficients of Harvest shock: Continued
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Table 3.1: Number of Households That Have Fields near the River
Number of households that
have fields near the river
Number of households that do
not have fields near the river Total
Site A 6 9 15
Site B 4 12 16
Site C 12 4 16
Total 22 25 47
(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.
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Table 3.2: Number of Household Years by Maize Purchase Patterns
Number % Number % Number % Number %
68 48% 27 57% 25 53% 16 34%
One or two times 30 21% 15 32% 8 17% 7 15%
More than two times 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 2 4%
One or two times 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2%
More than two times 35 25% 12 26% 17 36% 6 13%
73 52% 20 43% 22 47% 31 66%
141 100% 47 100% 47 100% 47 100%
ct
Crop Year 09/10 Crop Year 10/11
Purchase
Total
Over 3 years Crop Year 08/09
Purchase only until
December ("buy low")
Purchase some after
December ("buy high")
Does not purchase
(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project.54
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES N
Mean
(SD) N
Mean
(SD) Diff.
Weekly Variant Variables
Total Consumption (*1)
May 392 7,752 127 6,898 -854
(6032) (4381) (579)
June 396 8,704 117 7,898 -806
(7840) (3818) (750)
July 418 8,271 129 7,424 -847
(10065) (3599) (904)
August 405 7,925 133 7,402 -523
(5964) (3951) (553)
September 442 8,372 149 7,371 -1,001
(10715) (4300) (902)
October 413 6,986 159 7,108 122
(4375) (3601) (390)
November 431 7,236 145 7,684 448
(4968) (7046) (534)
December 482 9,682 170 8,037 -1,645**
(9744) (4486) (775)
January 412 8,594 142 7,563 -1,031
(7383) (3682) (646)
February 413 8,666 141 7,940 -726
(6535) (4651) (596)
March 485 8,832 166 8,236 -596
(5293) (4703) (463)
April 443 8,103 156 8,360 258
(5291) (13908) (784)
Staple Food (*1)
May 392 3,007 127 2,896 -111
(1566) (1640) (162)
June 396 3,326 117 3,234 -92
(1716) (1209) (170)
July 418 3,153 129 3,113 -41
(2524) (1306) (231)
August 405 3,015 133 3,108 93
(1801) (1507) (173)
September 442 3,225 149 3,203 -22
(4316) (1769) (364)
October 413 2,408 159 2,987 578***
(1409) (2170) (155)
November 431 2,679 145 2,897 218
(1573) (1314) (145)
December 482 3,208 170 3,223 14
(1987) (1599) (169)
January 412 3,293 142 3,135 -159
(1922) (1396) (175)
February 413 3,348 141 3,232 -116
(1897) (1764) (182)
March 485 3,736 166 3,567 -170
(2560) (2009) (219)
April 443 2,941 156 3,212 271
(2141) (1739) (190)
NBH BH 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics: Continued
VARIABLES N
Mean
(SD) N
Mean
(SD) Diff.
Non Staple Food  (*1)
May 392 3,302 127 2,841 -461
(3049) (2018) (289)
June 396 3,504 117 3,412 -92
(2777) (2140) (278)
July 418 3,062 129 3,136 74
(2892) (1681) (268)
August 405 3,247 133 3,312 66
(2349) (2144) (230)
September 442 3,468 149 3,153 -314
(2668) (1813) (235)
October 413 3,462 159 3,321 -141
(2406) (1973) (214)
November 431 3,549 145 3,335 -214
(3116) (2274) (281)
December 482 4,864 170 4,118 -746*
(4612) (3418) (387)
January 412 4,067 142 3,570 -497
(4828) (2608) (425)
February 413 3,848 141 3,757 -91
(3048) (2494) (285)
March 485 4,007 166 3,857 -151
(3425) (3613) (312)
April 443 3,792 156 3,601 -191
(2844) (5890) (361)
Non Food Item (*1)
May 392 1,443 127 1,161 -282
(4385) (3278) (423)
June 396 1,874 117 1,252 -622
(6023) (2087) (567)
July 418 2,056 129 1,175 -881
(8446) (2394) (753)
August 405 1,664 133 982.0 -682*
(4201) (1978) (377)
September 442 1,679 149 1,014 -665
(8735) (3015) (730)
October 413 1,115 159 800.2 -315
(2402) (1556) (205)
November 431 1,008 145 1,453 444
(2534) (5925) (354)
December 482 1,610 170 697.0 -913*
(6395) (1407) (495)
January 412 1,234 142 858.8 -375
(3995) (1365) (342)
February 413 1,469 141 950.6 -519
(4734) (2960) (425)
March 485 1,088 166 813.2 -275
(2432) (1312) (198)
April 443 1,370 156 1,547 177
(3355) (8281) (476)
NBH BH 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics: Continued
VARIABLES N
Mean
(SD) N
Mean
(SD) Diff.
Monthly Variant variables
Number of Adult males 1219 1.70 416 1.62 -0.08
(1.12) (1.17) (0.06)
Number of Adult females 1219 1.96 416 1.64 -0.33***
(1.33) (0.61) (0.07)
Number of Children (10-12 years) 1219 1.19 416 1.29 0.10*
(1.03) (1.00) (0.06)
Number of Children (7-9 years) 1219 0.98 416 1.10 0.12**
(0.81) (0.87) (0.05)
Number of Children (4-6 years) 1219 0.67 416 0.55 -0.12***
(0.76) (0.70) (0.04)
Number of Children (0-3 years) 1219 0.79 416 0.60 -0.19***
(0.92) (0.73) (0.05)
Year Variant Variables
Number of Cattle 105 3.47 36 1.69 -1.77**
(4.30) (2.42) (0.76)
Proportion of rental values of land whose crop situation is
"below average, because of reasons other than heavy rain, no
fertilizer, no seeds" to total rental values of land
105 0.17 35 0.19 0.02
(0.25) (0.30) (0.05)
Year In-Variant Variables
Dummy variable=1 if households have dry season maize field 35 0.51 12 0.33 -0.18
(0.51) (0.49) (0.17)
NBH BH 
(Source) Household Survey Data. Resilience Project
*1. Average consumption is per week per adult-equivalent. Numbers are in ZMK deflated
by a monthly price index (=1 as November 2007)
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results (Total Consumption) with HH Fixed Effects
VARIABLES Full Sample NBH BH NBH BH
(i) Income Shock * Month Dummy
May -0.275 -0.198 -0.363** -0.237 -0.361**
(0.185) (0.236) (0.160) (0.350) (0.158)
June -0.193 -0.142 -0.450*** -0.022 -0.459***
(0.139) (0.200) (0.118) (0.254) (0.119)
July -0.193 -0.130 -0.334*** -0.001 -0.340***
(0.152) (0.198) (0.087) (0.209) (0.072)
August -0.037 0.066 -0.321*** 0.104 -0.333***
(0.134) -0.142 (0.106) (0.181) (0.097)
September -0.143 -0.020 -0.399** -0.184 -0.404**
(0.185) (0.272) (0.183) (0.313) (0.172)
Octobor -0.062 0.016 -0.232 0.035 -0.237
(0.131) (0.176) (0.151) (0.244) (0.159)
November -0.277* -0.152 -0.840 -0.142 -0.806*
(0.153) (0.150) (0.492) (0.202) (0.459)
December -0.189 -0.072 -0.180 -0.172 -0.200
(0.179) (0.245) (0.121) (0.283) (0.126)
January -0.046 0.008 -0.096 0.074 -0.100
(0.174) (0.277) (0.105) (0.345) (0.113)
February -0.071 -0.023 -0.271* -0.134 -0.393***
(0.144) (0.207) (0.144) (0.281) (0.093)
March -0.056 0.028 -0.418*** 0.057 -0.529***
(0.119) (0.180) (0.116) (0.243) (0.145)
April -0.272 -0.016 -1.483 -0.149 -1.367*
(0.182) (0.233) (0.869) (0.303) (0.793)
(ii) Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.010 0.004
(0.034) (0.105)
June -0.035 0.035
(0.027) (0.165)
July -0.032* -0.051
(0.018) (0.171)
August -0.010 0.098
(0.023) (0.156)
September 0.043 0.050
(0.027) (0.121)
Octobor -0.006 0.050
(0.023) (0.135)
November -0.003 -0.011
(0.023) (0.153)
December 0.027 0.093
(0.022) (0.098)
January -0.019 0.053
(0.030) (0.112)
February 0.030 0.277***
(0.026) (0.096)
March -0.009 0.242**
(0.025) (0.107)
April 0.033 -0.131
(0.025) (0.189)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No
(i) F-statistics F(12,46) F(12,43) F(12,20) F(12,43) F(12,20)
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 0.84 0.84 21.42 0.54 17.45
p-value 0.6079 0.6092 0.0000 0.8746 0.0000
(ii) F-statistics F(12,43) F(12,20)
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 3.58 19.53
p-value 0.0010 0.0000
Observations 6,813 5,132 1,681 5,132 1,681
R-squared 0.178 0.203 0.182 0.204 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total Consumption
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results (Staple Food, Other Food, Non Food) with HH Fixed Effects
(a) NBH farmers
VARIABLES Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
(i) Income Shock * Month Dummy
May 0.016 -0.200 -0.689 -0.130 -0.117 -0.807
(0.173) (0.235) (0.714) (0.242) (0.342) (1.042)
June 0.017 0.003 -0.901 0.118 0.098 -0.670
(0.158) (0.173) (0.715) (0.211) (0.220) (0.980)
July -0.147 0.041 -0.553 -0.013 0.135 -0.341
(0.165) (0.162) (0.721) (0.227) (0.191) (0.770)
August 0.031 -0.152 0.734 0.043 -0.119 0.847
(0.127) (0.154) (0.599) (0.186) (0.167) (0.697)
September 0.176 -0.090 -0.283 0.071 -0.096 -1.009
(0.169) (0.173) (1.332) (0.190) (0.218) (1.344)
Octobor 0.101 -0.002 -0.132 0.100 0.051 -0.155
(0.121) (0.163) (0.639) (0.155) (0.211) (0.831)
November 0.024 -0.253 -0.288 0.094 -0.228 -0.455
(0.187) (0.160) (0.571) (0.212) (0.205) (0.736)
December 0.144 0.035 -0.859 0.224 -0.188 -1.040
(0.157) (0.220) (0.936) (0.207) (0.192) (1.163)
January -0.017 0.030 0.006 0.013 0.235 -0.220
(0.186) (0.378) (0.755) (0.225) (0.469) (0.886)
February 0.126 0.187 -0.935 0.058 0.094 -1.191
(0.175) (0.178) (0.849) (0.227) (0.216) (1.048)
March -0.011 0.019 0.143 0.066 0.056 0.039
(0.186) (0.188) (0.567) (0.231) (0.227) (0.725)
April 0.174 0.003 -0.503 0.027 -0.041 -0.845
(0.169) (0.262) (0.632) (0.209) (0.307) (0.855)
(ii) Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.038 -0.020 0.025
(0.027) (0.037) (0.093)
June -0.029 -0.026 -0.075
(0.027) (0.025) (0.139)
July -0.032 -0.022 -0.055
(0.026) (0.022) (0.050)
August -0.003 -0.008 -0.034
(0.020) (0.021) (0.108)
September 0.028 0.003 0.186
(0.028) (0.027) (0.163)
Octobor 0.001 -0.014 -0.001
(0.021) (0.024) (0.063)
November -0.018 -0.006 0.037
(0.027) (0.033) (0.057)
December -0.022 0.062* 0.043
(0.021) (0.032) (0.072)
January -0.008 -0.055 0.054
(0.025) (0.046) (0.078)
February 0.019 0.027 0.062
(0.027) (0.025) (0.077)
March -0.022 -0.009 0.022
(0.031) (0.026) (0.060)
April 0.037* 0.012 0.080
(0.021) (0.026) (0.071)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No No
(i) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 0.80 0.83 1.14 0.59 0.64 1.01
p-value 0.6454 0.6209 0.3545 0.8340 0.8003 0.4573
(ii) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 4.24 3.21 0.77
p-value 0.0002 0.0024 0.6744
Observations 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132
R-squared 0.189 0.246 0.086 0.191 0.248 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NBH
F(12,43)
F(12,43)
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(b) BH farmers
VARIABLES Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
(i) Income Shock * Month Dummy
May 0.070 -0.516* -0.951 0.034 -0.536* -0.803
(0.173) (0.252) (0.795) (0.186) (0.259) (0.771)
June 0.030 -0.744*** -0.765** 0.022 -0.785*** -0.696**
(0.145) (0.180) (0.331) (0.128) (0.196) (0.327)
July -0.044 -0.301*** -1.094*** -0.055 -0.323*** -1.043***
(0.141) (0.096) (0.316) (0.117) (0.091) (0.313)
August -0.121 -0.309 -0.817** -0.135 -0.307 -0.861**
(0.137) (0.221) (0.380) (0.133) (0.209) (0.390)
September -0.136 -0.280 -1.325 -0.212 -0.281 -1.175
(0.184) (0.173) (1.007) (0.194) (0.179) (0.904)
Octobor 0.055 -0.388* -0.476 -0.005 -0.377 -0.394
(0.151) (0.204) (0.385) (0.149) (0.228) (0.370)
November 0.030 -0.578* -3.547 -0.044 -0.579* -3.172
(0.194) (0.292) (2.384) (0.165) (0.316) (2.128)
December -0.104 -0.383* 0.194 -0.087 -0.416* 0.122
(0.147) (0.193) (0.365) (0.145) (0.201) (0.331)
January 0.020 -0.209* -0.058 0.056 -0.216* -0.146
(0.117) (0.110) (0.281) (0.126) (0.119) (0.274)
February -0.238** -0.167 -0.631 -0.375*** -0.280* -0.738
(0.084) (0.185) (0.479) (0.126) (0.153) (0.444)
March -0.185 -0.683*** -0.241 -0.218 -0.840*** -0.409
(0.133) (0.192) (0.403) (0.143) (0.276) (0.357)
April -0.278 -1.489* -4.245 -0.172 -1.456* -3.882
(0.165) (0.786) (3.059) (0.122) (0.744) (2.787)
(ii) Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.100 0.140 -0.583*
(0.087) (0.131) (0.295)
June -0.052 0.268* -0.390
(0.204) (0.131) (0.398)
July -0.032 0.045 -0.354
(0.198) (0.186) (0.401)
August 0.090 0.111 0.080
(0.106) (0.198) (0.396)
September 0.217** 0.150 -0.603
(0.098) (0.150) (0.392)
Octobor 0.141* 0.146 -0.417
(0.081) (0.175) (0.298)
November 0.160* 0.166 -0.882
(0.089) (0.149) (0.525)
December 0.001 0.247** -0.105
(0.125) (0.113) (0.333)
January -0.015 0.178 -0.128
(0.080) (0.116) (0.350)
February 0.303*** 0.383*** -0.067
(0.079) (0.112) (0.355)
March 0.097 0.442*** 0.036
(0.077) (0.137) (0.340)
April -0.115 0.119 -0.836
(0.103) (0.210) (0.661)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No No
(i) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 5.68 7.08 14.57 5.61 13.13 16.29
p-value 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
(ii) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 32.58 7.58 2.84
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0190
Observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.314 0.229 0.097 0.324 0.234 0.100
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
BH
F(12,20)
F(12,20)
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects)
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
May -0.130 -0.117 -0.807 0.034 -0.536* -0.803
(0.242) (0.342) (1.042) (0.186) (0.259) (0.771)
June 0.118 0.248 0.243 0.098 0.215 0.227 -0.670 0.137 0.139 0.022 -0.012 -0.018 -0.785*** -0.249 -0.225 -0.696** 0.107 0.243
(0.211) (0.167) (0.220) (0.349) (0.980) (0.937) (0.128) (0.144) (0.196) (0.183) (0.327) (0.766)
July -0.013 0.117 0.100 0.135 0.252 0.272 -0.341 0.466 0.408 -0.055 -0.089 -0.110 -0.323*** 0.213 0.235 -1.043*** -0.240 0.068
(0.227) (0.236) (0.191) (0.363) (0.770) (0.825) (0.117) (0.236) (0.091) (0.225) (0.313) (0.728)
August 0.043 0.173 0.180 -0.119 -0.002 0.015 0.847 1.654 1.739* -0.135 -0.169 -0.184 -0.307 0.229 0.201 -0.861** -0.058 0.000
(0.186) (0.233) (0.167) (0.346) (0.697) (0.911) (0.133) (0.237) (0.209) (0.352) (0.390) (0.963)
September 0.071 0.201 0.185 -0.096 0.021 0.004 -1.009 -0.202 -0.205 -0.212 -0.246 -0.252 -0.281 0.255 0.186 -1.175 -0.372 -0.585
(0.190) (0.256) (0.218) (0.304) (1.344) (0.831) (0.194) (0.180) (0.179) (0.246) (0.904) (1.067)
Octobor 0.100 0.230 0.191 0.051 0.168 0.120 -0.155 0.652 0.714 -0.005 -0.039 -0.050 -0.377 0.159 0.143 -0.394 0.409 0.324
(0.155) (0.227) (0.211) (0.335) (0.831) (0.769) (0.149) (0.216) (0.228) (0.155) (0.370) (0.805)
November 0.094 0.224 0.218 -0.228 -0.111 -0.150 -0.455 0.352 0.432 -0.044 -0.078 -0.074 -0.579* -0.043 -0.069 -3.172 -2.369 -2.549
(0.212) (0.341) (0.205) (0.266) (0.736) (0.635) (0.165) (0.241) (0.316) (0.213) (2.128) (2.198)
December 0.224 0.354 0.301 -0.188 -0.071 -0.115 -1.040 -0.233 -0.137 -0.087 -0.121 -0.118 -0.416* 0.120 0.104 0.122 0.925 0.924
(0.207) (0.302) (0.192) (0.367) (1.163) (0.825) (0.145) (0.143) (0.201) (0.335) (0.331) (0.850)
January 0.013 0.143 0.148 0.235 0.352 0.294 -0.220 0.587 0.714 0.056 0.022 0.034 -0.216* 0.320 0.318 -0.146 0.657 0.692
(0.225) (0.278) (0.469) (0.513) (0.886) (0.800) (0.126) (0.221) (0.119) (0.326) (0.274) (0.700)
February 0.058 0.188 0.192 0.094 0.211 0.133 -1.191 -0.384 -0.289 -0.375*** -0.409 -0.405** -0.280* 0.256 0.246 -0.738 0.065 0.066
(0.227) (0.264) (0.216) (0.327) (1.048) (0.786) (0.126) (0.183) (0.153) (0.273) (0.444) (0.993)
March 0.066 0.196 0.150 0.056 0.173 0.088 0.039 0.846 0.911 -0.218 -0.252 -0.244 -0.840*** -0.304 -0.319 -0.409 0.394 0.394
(0.231) (0.289) (0.227) (0.291) (0.725) (0.767) (0.143) (0.165) (0.276) (0.294) (0.357) (0.879)
April 0.027 0.157 0.154 -0.041 0.076 -0.007 -0.845 -0.038 0.200 -0.172 -0.206 -0.200 -1.456* -0.920 -0.923 -3.882 -3.079 -3.051
(0.209) (0.189) (0.307) (0.253) (0.855) (0.557) (0.122) (0.171) (0.744) (0.646) (2.787) (2.770)
Income Shock * Month Dummy
NBH BH
Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
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Table 3.6 Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects): Continued
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.038 -0.020 0.025 0.100 0.140 -0.583*
(0.027) (0.037) (0.093) (0.087) (0.131) (0.295)
June -0.029 -0.067 -0.068*** -0.026 -0.006 -0.009 -0.075 -0.100 -0.110 -0.052 -0.152 -0.184 0.268* 0.128 0.136*** -0.390 0.193 0.265
(0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.036) (0.139) (0.142) (0.204) (0.164) (0.131) (0.047) (0.398) (0.199)
July -0.032 -0.070 -0.065*** -0.022 -0.002 -0.003 -0.055 -0.080 -0.079 -0.032 -0.132 -0.198 0.045 -0.095 -0.085 -0.354 0.229 0.418
(0.026) (0.019) (0.022) (0.035) (0.050) (0.094) (0.198) (0.192) (0.186) (0.116) (0.401) (0.256)
August -0.003 -0.041 -0.039 -0.008 0.012 0.011 -0.034 -0.059 -0.067 0.090 -0.010 -0.057 0.111 -0.029 -0.061 0.080 0.663 0.617**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.108) (0.126) (0.106) (0.072) (0.198) (0.130) (0.396) (0.264)
September 0.028 -0.010 -0.007 0.003 0.023 0.024 0.186 0.161 0.152 0.217** 0.117 0.117 0.150 0.010 -0.023 -0.603 -0.020 -0.140
(0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.163) (0.131) (0.098) (0.073) (0.150) (0.106) (0.392) (0.336)
Octobor 0.001 -0.037 -0.034 -0.014 0.006 0.009 -0.001 -0.026 -0.034 0.141* 0.041 0.062 0.146 0.006 -0.035 -0.417 0.166 -0.021
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.063) (0.068) (0.081) (0.091) (0.175) (0.095) (0.298) (0.242)
November -0.018 -0.056 -0.055 -0.006 0.014 0.016 0.037 0.012 -0.000 0.160* 0.060 0.079 0.166 0.026 -0.005 -0.882 -0.299 -0.421
(0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.057) (0.063) (0.089) (0.085) (0.149) (0.096) (0.525) (0.466)
December -0.022 -0.060 -0.054* 0.062* 0.082 0.081* 0.043 0.018 0.004 0.001 -0.099 -0.103 0.247** 0.107 0.072 -0.105 0.478 0.346
(0.021) (0.030) (0.032) (0.045) (0.072) (0.066) (0.125) (0.103) (0.113) (0.121) (0.333) (0.222)
January -0.008 -0.046 -0.045* -0.055 -0.035 -0.027 0.054 0.029 0.009 -0.015 -0.115 -0.093 0.178 0.038 0.014 -0.128 0.455 0.314
(0.025) (0.027) (0.046) (0.049) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.116) (0.098) (0.350) (0.254)
February 0.019 -0.019 -0.018 0.027 0.047 0.056 0.062 0.037 0.019 0.303*** 0.203 0.220*** 0.383*** 0.243 0.218 -0.067 0.516 0.386
(0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.036) (0.077) (0.067) (0.079) (0.072) (0.112) (0.128) (0.355) (0.275)
March -0.022 -0.060 -0.056 -0.009 0.011 0.021 0.022 -0.003 -0.018 0.097 -0.003 0.018 0.442*** 0.302 0.282* 0.036 0.619 0.498**
(0.031) (0.034) (0.026) (0.032) (0.060) (0.075) (0.077) (0.060) (0.137) (0.157) (0.340) (0.238)
April 0.037* -0.001 0.001 0.012 0.032 0.039 0.080 0.055 0.025 -0.115 -0.215 -0.183 0.119 -0.021 -0.054 -0.836 -0.253 -0.473
(0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) (0.071) (0.062) (0.103) (0.113) (0.210) (0.149) (0.661) (0.622)
NBH BH
Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
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Chapter 4
Identifying Intricately Woven Peer
Effects in a Specialized Team1
4.1 Introduction
Teamwork plays an important role in workplaces globally. People divide work among
members of a team who are assigned particular tasks (e.g. cleaners of a huge building,
mail sorting clerks, and so on). In many cases, different tasks are allocated to each worker
(e.g. factory workers in an assembly line), and in many cases, each task requires highly
specialized skills (e.g. a team in a consulting firm). There is considerable interdependence
among workers and, consequently, there are many cross-worker interactions and influences.
To improve teamwork in such workplaces, knowledge of how people in teams influence
each other - what is called “peer effects” - is essential.
Although teamwork could produce more than the sum of individual production through
synergy effects, it could also produce less due to the free ride problem; a member of the
1This chapter is co-authored with Avner Ben-Ner.
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team may provide less than optimal effort for the team, and the extent to which this happens
could depend on the output of other members of the group (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 1992).
Thus, much empirical literature has addressed whether, and to what extent, the productiv-
ity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers (e.g. Falk and Ichino, 2006, and
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005), and most of them focus on peer effects in the divi-
sion of work among low-skilled workers. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) examined
checkout cashiers for a large grocery chain, and Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2015) looked
at sales clerks, movie theater concession stand employees, and so on. Other studies have
examined high-skilled laborers, but most of them have focused on knowledge spillovers
(e.g. Jackson and Brugmann, 2009, Waldinger, 2010, Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou,
2015, and Ichniowski and Preston, 2013). However, these studies do not address a com-
mon aspect of team production: each member of the team is allocated different specialized
tasks, and the interactions between each member are quite complex. The aim of this paper
is to shed light on such intricately woven peer effects in a specialized team.
Gould and Winter (2009) is the only previous study that has addressed this aspect of
peer effects. Using a panel data set of professional baseball players from 1970 to 2003,
they examined peer effects from pitching performance and batting performance of other
players. They showed that a player’s batting average significantly increases with the bat-
ting performance of other players on his team, but decreases with the quality of the team’s
pitching. They also showed that a pitcher’s performance increases with the pitching qual-
ity of the other pitchers on the same team, but is unaffected by the batting output of the
pitcher’s team. These heterogenous impacts are well explained by the different produc-
tion technologies in players’ tasks. However, one drawback of their analysis is that they
simplified the complex interactions in games to make their identification feasible.2 More
2See Manski (1993) for a general discussion regarding the difficulties of econometrically identifying peer
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specifically, they ignored peer effects from opponent players. They also assumed that there
are no exogenous peer effects, which are the peer effects transmitted through other play-
ers’ fixed characteristics (e.g. age, tenure). These simplifications may overlook important
aspects of peer effects.
Our paper contributes to the literature on peer effects among high-skilled laborers in a
team. We suggest a unique framework to analyze peer effects in a specialized team without
simplifying the complex interactions in the team. To illustrate the framework, we use a
longitudinal data set of all soccer players in the top German league (the Bundesliga) during
ten seasons (2000/01-2009/10), and identify intricately woven peer effects in soccer games.
We impose the network structure on the players in the games, and estimate a structural
model of networks by applying the spatial econometric methodology suggested by Lee and
Yu (2014). Then, we address the following questions: (1) Does the short-term performance
of one worker affect the performance of other workers on the same team? If so, does the
effect of peers depend on the nature of tasks? (2) Does the performance of competitors
affect workers’ performance? and (3) What individual and team attributes affect workers’
performance?
Our estimation results show: (1) There are positive endogenous peer effects from team-
mates, but the extent of the impacts varies depending on the nature of the task (the goal
keeper differs from all other positions); (2) In contrast, there are negative endogenous
peer effects from opponent players onto defense players, mid-fielders, and forward play-
ers, while they are slightly positive for the goal keeper; (3) There are negative impacts of
ethnic diversity among offensive players (mid-fielders and forward players), but they are
mitigated over time.
effects.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the difficulties of
identification of peer effects, and discusses how the network approach solves these prob-
lems. Section 3 describes the data we use, Section 4 presents estimation strategies, and
Section 5 provides estimation results. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
4.2 The Estimation Problem and the Network Approach
4.2.1 Difficulties of Identifying Peer Effects: The Reflection Problem
To identify peer effects, a linear-in-means model is often used, which is given by:
yir =  + E[yir j r] + E[xir j r] + xir + uir (4.1)
where yir is the performance of player i in group r (e.g. team) with exogenous characteris-
tics xir (e.g. player’s age), and uir is an error term with uir = ur + ir and E[uir j r] = ur.
The expectations are averages of yir; xir and uir for group r. In this model,  represents the
impact of endogenous effects and  represents the impact of exogenous effects. Identify-
ing endogenous peer effects separately from exogenous peer effects is important, because
endogenous peer effects generate social multiplier effects, while exogenous peer effects do
not. For example, if endogenous peer effects exist, introducing a high productivity worker
to a team improves performances of his or her co-workers, which in turn will improve the
performance of the high productivity worker, and so on. Taking the conditional expectation
on r and rearranging terms, equation (4.1) becomes
E[yir j r] = 
1   +
 + 
1  E[xir j r] +
1
1  ur (4.2)
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Substitute equation (4.2) into (4.1), then
yir =

1   +
 + 
1   E[xir j r] + xir +

1  ur + uir (4.3)
Manski (1993) shows that  and  cannot be identified separately (the reflection problem).
Thus, most studies implicitly assume that either endogenous peer effects () or exogenous
peer effects () are zero.3 Moreover, even if we assume no exogenous peer effects, that is,
yir =  + E[yir j r] + xir + uir (4.4)
identifying endogenous effects () is still not an easy task. One problem is simultaneous
effects, in which an individual’s behavior in a group and the behavior of other members
of the group simultaneously affect each other. Another problem is unobservable correlated
effects. One example of unobservable correlated effects in the soccer context is the funding
ability of a team, that is, a team with strong funding ability can hire players with high
ability, and hence, the average team ability will also be high. In this case, endogenous
peer effects will be overestimated. Common solutions for these two problems are using
instrumental variables, fixed effects, lag variables, and randomized experiments. More
details are discussed in Mouw (2006).
4.2.2 Network Approach
Basic Idea
This subsection summarizes how the network approach (e.g., Bramoule et al, 2009, Calvo-
Armengol et al, 2009, Lin, 2010, Liu et al, 2011, Patacchini et al, 2017) solves the identifi-
3The latter assumption ( = 0) implies that average age or average tenure in the game does not affect
player’s performance. The former assumption ( = 0) is that there are no endogenous effects.
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cation problems of peer effects, including the reflection problem, simultaneous effects and
unobservable correlated effects. The reflection problem arises because the reference group
completely overlaps among players. To break the reflection problem, the network approach
generates individual-level variation within the reference group by imposing network struc-
tures among players. Figure 4.1 illustrates the example of network structure among players
in a soccer game. The direction of each arrow represents the direction of impact. Note
that the reference group varies by the position of the players. For example, in this setting,
the reference group of a goal keeper is the defense players, while the reference group of a
defense player is a goal keeper, other defense players and mid-fielders. These variations of
reference group overcome the reflection problem.
The network structure of players can also be used to solve the identification problem
caused by simultaneous effects and unobservable correlated effects by providing a mecha-
nism for constructing valid instrumental variable for these effects. To see how the network
structure can be used to construct instruments, consider the simple network represented in
Figure 4.2. The performance of player A (ya) is influenced by the performance of player B
(yb), and the performance of player B is influenced by the performance of player C. Player
C has an impact on player A only through player B. In this case, exogenous characteristics
of player C (xc) can be valid instruments for yb.
Specification
The network structure can be formulated by defining an adjacency matrix. Let N =
f1;    ; ng be a finite set of players, and define the adjacency matrix as W = wij where
wij = 1 if player i is directly influenced by player j, and wij = 0 otherwise. Figure 4.3
illustrates one example where n equals three, say, players A, B, and C with exogenous vari-
able xa; xb, and xc, respectively. (For simplicity, xa; xb, and xc are assumed to be scalars.)
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Assume that players’ performances (ya; yb, and yc) are determined by the sum of refer-
ence players’ performance (the direction of the arrow represents the direction of impact) as
well as their own exogenous variable,4 then players’ performance on this network can be
represented as
Y = WY + X +  (4.5)
where Y = (ya; yb; yc)0; X = (xa; xb; xc)0;  = (a; b; c)0 and the 0is(i 2 fa; b; cg) are i.i.d
random variables, and the adjacency matrix is given by
W =
266664
0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
377775 (4.6)
Note that
WY =
266664
0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
377775
266664
ya
yb
yc
377775 =
266664
yb + yc
ya + yc
0
377775 (4.7)
If W is row-normalized to one, WY represents the average of performances of adjacent
players.
Constructing Instruments
Since Y and WY are determined simultaneously in equation (4.5), instrumental variables
for WY are necessary to identify endogenous peer effects . Continuing with the example
4To simplify the explanation, players’ performances are assumed neither to be influenced by other play-
ers’ exogenous variables nor by performances in the previous game. These assumptions are relaxed in the
following section.
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in Figure 4.3, WX provides valid instruments for WY ,
WX =
266664
0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
377775
266664
xa
xb
xc
377775 =
266664
xb + xc
xa + xc
0
377775 (4.8)
because xb + xc influences player A only through the performances of players B and C (yb
and yc), xa + xc influences player B only through the performances of players A and C (ya
and yc), and neither xa nor xb influence player C. Note that, if W is row-normalized to one,
WX represents the average of the exogenous variables of adjacent players.
One advantage of this approach is that, in theory, we can construct multiple (or infinite)
numbers of instruments from one exogenous variable under some plausible conditions. To
see how this works, consider Figure 4.3. There are two “two arrow” impacts on player A.
The first is from player C to player B, and then to player A. The second is from player A to
player B, and then back player A. The W matrix can be used to show this. The “2 arrow”
effects on all three players can be shown by the matrix W 2 where
W 2 =
266664
0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
377775
266664
0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
377775 =
266664
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0
377775 (4.9)
As is in the case of p = 1, W 2X can be instruments for each player where
W 2X =
266664
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0
377775
266664
xa
xb
xc
377775 =
266664
xa + xc
xb + xc
0
377775 (4.10)
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The first row of W 2X (= xa + xc) captures the impact of player A himself and player C
through player B on player A, both of which pass through two arrows. More generally,
all “p arrow” impacts are given by W p.5 Likewise, W 3X;W 4X;    can be the instru-
ments for each player as long as the matrices X;WX;W 2X;W 3X;W 4X;    are linearly
independent.6
Introducing Heterogeneity
The peer effect of one player (e.g. a goal keeper) on another player (e.g. a defense player)
could be different from the peer effect of a different type of player (e.g. a forward player) on
another player (e.g. a mid-fielder). Another noteworthy feature of this network approach
is that we can analyze heterogenous peer effects by overlaying adjacency matrices. To
see how this works, consider a futsal7 example represented in Figure 4.4. Assuming that
the impacts of peer effects are different depending on their positions, we can define the
adjacency matrix as
WFW =
266666666664
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
377777777775
WMF =
266666666664
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
377777777775
WDF =
266666666664
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
377777777775
5See pp.23-24 in Jackson (2008) for more formal discussions.
6In the case of Figure 4.3, W 3X is not a new set of valid instruments, because WX =W 3X .
7The indoor soccer game which is played between two teams of five players each.
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WGK =
266666666664
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
377777777775
(4.11)
where player i corresponds to the i th row, and players’ performances can be formulated as:
Y =
X
k
kWkY + X +  (4.12)
where Y = (y1; y2; y3; y4; y5)0; X = (x1; x2; x3; x4; x5)0;  = (1; 2; 34; 5)0, i’s (i =
1;    ; 5) are i.i.d, k 2 fFW;MF;DF;GKg, and k’s represent the heterogenous peer
effects, depending on the position k. This feature enables us to analyze diverse aspects of
peer effects in a soccer game in a flexible manner.
4.3 Data
Bundesliga is a professional football league in Germany, which consists of 18 teams. Sea-
sons run from August to May, and a system of promotion and relegation with the 2nd
Bundesliga (lower division) is adopted: in each season, the top three teams of the 2nd Bun-
desliga in the final standing are promoted to the Bundesliga and the bottom three teams
of the Bundesliga are relegated to 2nd Bundesliga. Our data set was provided by IMPIRE
AG, and covers 10 seasons between 2000/2001 and 2009/2010. The data set consists of:
(1) Team data by season; (2) Team data by game; and (3) Player data by game. Player data
by game includes name, nationality, age, team, position, and player performance in the
game. Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the variables used in estimation. Player per-
formance is rated on a 0 (worst) to 10 (best) scale, which is a weighted average of several
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objective indicators such as the number of tackles won, tackles lost, and aerial challenges
won, on the basis of the player’s position. Since the weights on objective indicators are
determined by the rating company so that the aggregated index represents each player’s
performance in each game, this index represents subjective player performance. Figure
4.5 shows the distribution of the players’ performance. Age is player’s age in years, and
team tenure is the number of years since the players’ first game with their current team. To
represent the diversity of each team in each season, we construct a diversity index defined
as 1  PKk=1(pk)2, where pk is the proportion of players’ ethnicity on the team, and thusPK
k=1(pk)
2 is a Herfindahl index. To define ethnicity, we use Levinson (1998)’s classifica-
tion based on language and geographical/cultural markers. A player on a team in a season
is defined as a player who played at least one game during the season. In addition to this
team diversity index among all players, we also define team diversity separately for defen-
sive players and of offensive players, which are calculated as the diversity index among
defensive players (a goal keeper, defense players, and mid-fielders), and offensive players
(defense players, mid-fielders, and forward players). More details regarding these indices
are discussed in Ben-Ner, Licht and Park (2017).
4.4 Estimation Strategies
Based on the network approach, we use the spatial dynamic panel data (SDPD) econometric
models with fixed effects developed by Lee and Yu (2014). The general specification for
player n in game g in season s is:
Yngs =
JX
j=1
jWjYngs + Yngs 1 +
JX
j=1
jWjXngs +Xngs + Cn + Vngs (4.13)
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where Yngs = (y1gs;    ; yNgs)0 and Vngs = (v1gs;    ; vNgs)0 are N1 column vectors,
and the error terms vigs are i.i.d. across n, g, and s with zero mean and variance 20 . Sub-
script n 2 f1;    ; Ng represents a player (N is the number of players in the league.),
g 2 G = f1;    ; 34g represents the game index which is arranged in time series in each
season, and s 2 S = f2000;    ; 2010g represents seasons. The dependent variable yngs
is player n’s performance in game g within season s. The N1 column vectors Yngs 1 =
(y1gs 1;    ; yNgs 1)0 are lagged player’s performance, and thus  captures spells of good
or bad performance over seasonal games. The Nk matrix Xngs = (x1gs;    ; xNgs)0 are
exogenous variables, such as age and tenure. Cn = (c1;    ; cN) is an N1 column vector
of individual fixed effects. Wj is an NN adjacency matrix where j 2 f1;    ; Jg.8 As
for the interpretation of coefficients, j represents endogenous effects, and j represents
exogenous peer effects.
Roodman (2006) explains that, under the dynamic panel setting, there are two com-
mon ways to eliminate individual fixed effects in estimating (4.13) - first difference (FD)
transformation and forward orthogonal difference (FOD) transformation. The FD trans-
formation eliminates individual fixed effects by subtracting the previous observation from
the contemporaneous one, and the FOD transformation substracts the average of all future
available observations of a variable. There are two advantages of the FOD transformation
over the FD transformation. First, while the resulting disturbances after the FD transfor-
mation have serial correlation, the disturbances after the FOD transformation remain i.i.d
if they are originally i.i.d. Second, the FD transformation magnifies gaps in an unbalanced
panel, that is, if one variable, say yit, is missing, then both yit and yit+1 are missing
in the transformed data. Thus, in this paper, we apply the FOD transformation to equation
8We can interpret Wj as a spatial weights matrix in the spatial econometrics literature.
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(4.13), which yields equation (4.14) :
Y ngs =
JX
j=1
jWjY

ngs + Y

ngs 1 +
JX
j=1
jWjX

ngs +X

ngs + V

ngs (4.14)
where Y ngs = (y1gs;    ; yNgs)0, Xngs = (x1gs;    ; xNgs)0 and V ngs = (v1gs;    ; vNgs)0,
defining 	i(g; s) = f(g0; s0) 2 G S j (s0 = s and g0 > g) or s0 > sg for player i, and
yigs = cigs
0@yigs   1
Tigs
X
(g0;s0)2	i(g;s)
yig0s0
1A (4.15)
xigs = cigs
0@xigs   1
Tigs
X
(g0;s0)2	i(g;s)
xig0s0
1A (4.16)
vigs = cigs
0@vigs   1
Tigs
X
(g0;s0)2	i(g;s)
vig0s0
1A (4.17)
where Tigs is the number of elements of 	i(g; s), and the scale factor is cigs =p
Tigs=(Tigs + 1). Note that the choice of cigs assures the i.i.d property of disturbance
terms.
The network structure imposed on players in each game is represented in Figure 4.6.
Among teammates, the performance of the goal keeper is affected by the defense players,
the performance of a defense player is affected by the goal keeper, the other defense players
and mid-fielders, the performance of a mid-fielder is affected by the defense players, the
other mid-fielders and the forward players, and the performance of a forward player is
affected by the mid-fielders and the other forward players. The performance of the players
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in an opponent team is also taken into consideration. The performance of a goal keeper is
affected by the opponents’ forward players and mid-fielders, the performance of a defense
player is also affected by opponents’ forward players and mid-fielders, the performance
of a mid-fielder is affected by the opponents’ forward players, mid-fielders, and defense
players, and performance of a forward player is affected by opponent mid-fielders, defense
players, and goal keeper. Each player’s performance is also assumed to depend on his
performance in the previous game. Note that any peer effects which are not captured in
this network structure (e.g. peer effects from mid-fielders to a goal keeper) are in the error
terms of equation (4.13).
The degrees of the impacts of peer effects, which are both from teammates and op-
ponent players, are assumed to be different by position. The exogenous characteristics of
players’ age, age squared value, and team tenure are added, and their impacts are captured
by . The exogenous peer effects from adjacent players’ age, its squared value, and team
tenure are captured by 0js. In addition, the average age and average team tenure of team-
mates in each game are taken into consideration. Team diversity among all players is also
added to the estimation equation: if team diversity disturbs communication among players,
its impact could be negative, and if team diversity enhances the creativity of team produc-
tion, it could be positive. Since such an impact could differ depending on the nature of team
production, the impact of ethnic diversity is allowed to differ by position. Moreover, the
impact of ethnic diversity may change over time. For example, a diverse team may perform
poorly at first due to poor communication, but this problem may be resolved over time.
Thus, cross terms of ethnic diversity and game index, which are arranged in time series in
each season, are added. To take into account the endogenous network formation arising
from different recruiting policies, season specific team fixed effects, as well as individual
fixed effects, are added. Error terms are clustered by players.
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As instrumental variables for WjY nsg and Y nsg 1, we use the previous game’s team-
mates and opponent players’ exogenous characteristics, performance, and team environ-
ment (average age, average tenure, and home dummy), as well as the previous game’s
opponent players’ previous game’s performance, which would affect players’ performance
through their performance in previous game. As additional instruments, we use previous
game’s performance of opponent players, which would affect players’ performance through
performance of current performance of opponent players.
4.5 Estimation Results
Equation (4.14) was estimated by both OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS), and the
estimation results are reported in Table 4.2 . The first and second columns of Table 2
show the OLS and 2SLS estimators, respectively. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics
for the test of weak instruments is 10.379, which states that instruments have reasonable
explanatory power for the endogenous variables. In addition, the p-value of Hansen’s J
statistics for the over-identification tests is 0.777 (2(26) = 20:313), so we cannot reject
the null-hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. Thus, the 2SLS estimation results
can now be used to address three questions regarding peer effects in a specialized team: (1)
Does the short-term performance of one worker affect the performance of other workers
on the same team? If so, does the effect of peers vary by the nature of the tasks? (2) Does
the performance of competitors affect worker performance? (3) What individual and team
attributes affect workers’ performance?
For the first question, which is about endogenous peer effects among teammates, OLS
results indicate that, for any player, good performances of adjacent teammates improve his
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performance. For example, a defense player’s performance improves by 0.572 points when
the average performance of his adjacent teammates (a goal keeper, other defense players,
and mid-fielders) increases by one point. In addition, the extents of these impacts are simi-
lar regardless of a player’s position (0.470, 0.572, 0.503, 0.444 for a goal keeper, a defense
player, a mid-fielder, and a forward player). But recall that OLS estimators do not con-
trol the simultaneous effects, in which players’ performances in the game are determined
on the complex network represented in Figure 6. It is also worth noting that OLS can-
not detect asymmetric impacts of endogenous peer effects between two players, because
endogenous peer effects estimated by OLS are just a conditional correlation between the
two players. This may produce estimates with similar impacts among different positions.
Moreover, unobservable factors which are not captured by fixed effects cause bias in OLS
estimation. For example, peer effects which are not captured in the network structure in
Figure 4.6 are in the error term. The 2SLS estimators reported in the second column of Ta-
ble 4.2 control these potential problems. The 2SLS estimaters (0.764, 1.412, 1.177, 1.444
for a goal keeper, a defense player, a mid-fielder, and a forward player, respectively) are
larger than the OLS estimators, indicating that endogenous peer effects from teammates
estimated by OLS are under-estimated. Looking at the extent of endogenous peer effects
from teammates, it is relatively small for a goal keeper, compared to other players of differ-
ent positions. This may reflect the fact that a goal keeper’s interactions are fewer compared
to those of defense players, mid-fielders, and forward players.
For the second question, which is about endogenous peer effects from opponent play-
ers, the OLS results exhibit significantly negative coefficients for all of the positions, that
is, good performances of opponent players decrease a player’s performance. Looking at
the results of 2SLS, this implication is true for defense players, mid-fielders, and forward
players, although OLS estimators are over-estimated. One interesting asymmetric result
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is that the coefficient for a goal keeper is no longer significantly negative. Rather, it is
positive with a relatively small standard errors (The p-value is 0.140), meaning that high
performances of forward players and mid-fielders on the opposing team could improve a
goal keepers’ performance. These results of endogenous peer effects from opponent play-
ers imply that severe environmental factors or hard tasks could decline, have no effect, or
even improve players’ productivities, depending on the nature of the task in a team.
For the third question, which is about exogenous peer effects and other control vari-
ables, both the average age and the average squared age of adjacent teammates in the game
affect a player’s performance,9 while the coefficients of an average team tenure of adjacent
teammates have no significant effort for any position. As for the exogenous peer effects
from adjacent opponent players in the game, the impacts of the average age and the aver-
age squared age are large for the goal keeper, and the average team tenure has significantly
negative effects on defense players and on forward players. Note that the impact of team
diversity on a player’s performance cannot be estimated, because the diversity index, which
represents the team ethnic diversity among all players who played at least one game during
the season in the team, is captured by the season specific team fixed effects in the second
column of Table 2. Thus, we also estimate equation (4.14) by controlling for team fixed
effects and season fixed effects separately.
The third column of Table 4.2 shows the 2SLS results with both types of fixed effects.
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics for the test of weak instruments is 11.789, and
the p-value of Hansen’s J statistics for the over-identification tests is 0.830 (2(26) =
19:163). In addition, the estimation results are similar to those with season-specific team
9The coefficients for the goal keeper and the defense players are not significant, even though they have
relatively low standard errors.
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fixed effects. Thus, the 2SLS estimators reported in the third column of Table 2 can be
used to measure the impacts of a team diversity. Note that the impact of the diversity index
is allowed to be different by each player’s position, that is, the cross terms of the diversity
index and players’ position dummy variables are added to the equation. To see how these
impacts change over time, the cross-terms of these indices and the game index, which are
arranged in time series in each season, are also added. Looking at the coefficients of the
diversity index, which represent the impacts of the team diversity on a player’s performance
in the first game in the season, there is no strong evidence that a team’s diversity affects
a player’s performance, although all coefficients are negative. However, the coefficient of
the cross term of the diversity index and the game index is significantly positive and equal
to 0.007 for a mid-fielder.10 This means that a 0.1 point increase in the diversity index will
improve a mid-fielder’s performance per 0.0007 by one game. Since each team plays 34
games in one season, 0.1 points of the increase of the diversity index will result in a 0.0238
(= 0:0007  34) point increase in a mid-fielder’s performance by the last game.
Instead of using the diversity index among all players, if the index is defined as the di-
versity among players with a similar mission, we can see the impacts of the diversity more
clearly. Following Ben-Ner, Licht, and Park (2017), the diversity index among defensive
players (a goal keeper, defense players, and mid-fielders), and offensive players (defense
players, mid-fielders, and forward players) are constructed. The cross terms of each diver-
sity index and its position dummy variable (defensive player dummy and offensive player
dummy) are added to equation (4.14). The cross terms of these indices and the game in-
dex are also added. The fourth column of Table 4.2 shows the 2SLS results with these
diversity indices. The results show that defensive players’ diversity does not affect a de-
10The F-statistics for the null hypothesis that all the four cross terms are zero is 10.56 (p-value is 0.0320).
Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected.
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fensive player’s performance. On the other hand, the offensive players’ diversity decreases
a offensive player’s performance at the beginning of the season, but this negative effect is
mitigated over time, although it takes 54 (t 0:326=0:006) games to offset this negative im-
pact. This indicates that we should evaluate the impact of diversity on a team performance
not only in the short run, but also in the long run, and it would take a long time to bring
about any benefit of diversity to a team.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the features of peer effects for a team where each member of the
team is allocated a different specialized task, and the interactions between each member
are quite complex. We use a longitudinal data set of all soccer players in the top German
league (the Bundesliga) over the course of ten seasons (2000/01-2009/10), and identify
various aspects of peer effects among players on a team in a game. We draw three ma-
jor conclusions: (1) There are positive endogenous peer effects from teammates, but the
extent of the impacts varies depending on the nature of the task (the impact for the goal
keeper differs from the impacts for all other positions); (2) In contrast, there are negative
endogenous peer effects from opponent players onto defense players, mid-fielders, and for-
ward players, although te effect is slightly positive for a goal keeper; (3) There are negative
impacts ethnic diversity among offensive players (mid-fielders and forward players), but
they are mitigated over time. Our unique application of the network approach enables us
to identify intricately woven peer effects. This approach is applicable to other workplaces
with specialized teams, such as consulting teams. Further studies should be conducted to
analyze these relations within other types of specialized teams.
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Figure 4.1: Example of Network Structure in a Soccer Game
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Figure 4.2: Identification by Network Structure
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Figure 4.3: Example of Network Structure (n=3)
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Figure 4. Heterogeneity in a Simplified Game: Example of Futsal 
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Figure 5. Histogram of Player Performance: All Players (N=83345) 
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of Player Performance: All Players (N=83,345)
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Figure 6. Estimated Network Structure in a Game 
GK : Goal Keeper   DF : Defense Player   MF : Mid-fielder   FW : Forward Player 
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Figure 4.6: Estimated Network Structure in a Game
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Player performance 83,345 5.957 1.505 0 10
Player performance by position
Goal Keeper 6,218 6.502 1.511 1.100 10
Defense Player 28,546 5.843 1.475 0.500 10
Mid-fielder 28,612 5.944 1.509 0 10
Forward Player 19,969 5.970 1.504 1.300 10
Age 83,345 27.08 4.040 16.92 40.54
Age by position
Goal Keeper 6,218 29.59 4.662 18.64 40.54
Defense Player 28,546 26.94 3.750 17.70 39.55
Mid-fielder 28,612 26.98 4.184 16.92 38.51
Forward Player 19,969 26.62 3.738 17.71 37.45
Team Tenure 83,345 2.201 2.360 0 21.21
Team Tenure by position
Goal Keeper 6,218 2.811 2.911 0 21.21
Defense Player 28,546 2.216 2.220 0 15.98
Mid-fielder 28,612 2.285 2.500 0 17.85
Forward Player 19,969 1.869 2.092 0 13.94
Team Diversity
All Players 180 0.692 0.093 0.361 0.854
Defensive Players 180 0.644 0.118 0.185 0.852
Offensive Players 180 0.708 0.100 0.367 0.878
(Source) IMPIRE AG 88
Table 4.2: Estimation Results: Equation (4.14)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
I. Endogenous Effects ()
From Teammates
Goal Keeper 0.470*** 0.764*** 0.732*** 0.741***
(0.023) (0.124) (0.122) (0.121)
Defense Player 0.572*** 1.412*** 1.389*** 1.388***
(0.016) (0.107) (0.103) (0.105)
Mid-fielder 0.503*** 1.177*** 1.170*** 1.170***
(0.019) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088)
Forward Player 0.444*** 1.444*** 1.453*** 1.459***
(0.019) (0.117) (0.115) (0.116)
From Opponent Players
Goal Keeper -0.521*** 0.211 0.177 0.177
(0.029) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144)
Defense Player -0.361*** -0.189** -0.209*** -0.212***
(0.015) (0.074) (0.067) (0.067)
Mid-fielder -0.455*** -0.141* -0.149** -0.147**
(0.020) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Forward Player -0.343*** -0.093* -0.106** -0.105**
(0.019) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
II. Lag Variable 
Player's performance in the previous game 0.061*** 0.037*** 0.029** 0.030**
(0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
III. Exogenous Effects()
(A) From adjacent teammates in the game 
Goal Keeper
Average Age -0.709*** -0.416 -0.543* -0.542*
(0.253) (0.273) (0.279) (0.280)
Average Age Squared 0.012*** 0.008 0.010** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Average Team Tenure 0.079** -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
Defense Player
Average Age -0.373** -0.263 -0.305 -0.310
(0.174) (0.195) (0.190) (0.189)
Average Age Squared 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Average Team Tenure 0.055** 0.048 0.031 0.032
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
Mid-fielder
Average Age -0.553*** -0.795*** -0.725*** -0.710***
(0.207) (0.224) (0.211) (0.208)
Average Age Squared 0.007* 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Average Team Tenure 0.038 0.013 -0.002 0.000
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032)
Forward Player

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Table 4.2 Estimation Results: Equation (4.14): Continued
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Forward Player
Average Age 0.071 -0.442** -0.343 -0.367*
(0.191) (0.224) (0.221) (0.221)
Average Age Squared -0.005 0.008* 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Average Team Tenure 0.029 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014
(0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
(B) From adjacent opponent players in the game
Goal Keeper
Average Age -0.648*** -1.137*** -1.143*** -1.142***
(0.202) (0.259) (0.260) (0.265)
Average Age Squared 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Average Team Tenure 0.066* 0.006 0.013 0.010
(0.037) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Defense Player
Average Age 0.317*** 0.192 0.199 0.202
(0.122) (0.152) (0.149) (0.149)
Average Age Squared -0.005** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average Team Tenure 0.081*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.069***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Mid-fielder
Average Age 0.294* 0.228 0.215 0.213
(0.162) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173)
Average Age Squared -0.005* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average Team Tenure 0.099*** -0.039 -0.035 -0.034
(0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Forward Player
Average Age -0.703*** -0.296* -0.325** -0.319**
(0.139) (0.152) (0.154) (0.156)
Average Age Squared 0.013*** 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average Team Tenure 0.034 -0.095*** -0.098*** -0.100***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
IV. Player's own characteristics ()
Age -0.038 0.239* 0.250* 0.215**
(0.118) (0.133) (0.128) (0.084)
Age Squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Team Tenure 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
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Table 4.2 Estimation Results: Equation (4.14): Continued
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
V. Other Variables
(A) Diversity Index
Team Diversity
Goal Keeper -0.139
(0.420)
Defense Player -0.110
(0.216)
Mid-fielder -0.164
(0.258)
Forward Player -0.551
(0.370)
Team Diversity * game
Goal Keeper 0.008* 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Defense Player 0.009** 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Mid-fielder 0.012*** 0.007* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Forward Player 0.011*** 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Team Position Diversity
Defensive Players 0.012
(0.138)
Offensive Players -0.326*
(0.187)
Team Position Diversity * game
Defensive Players 0.003
(0.002)
Offensive Players 0.006***
(0.002)
(B) Additional Control Variables
Average Age of teammate in the game 0.003 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Average Tenure of teammate in the game -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
Home Dummy 0.056*** -0.143*** -0.148*** -0.148***
(0.013) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Fixed Effects
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team - - Yes Yes
Season - - Yes Yes
Team*Season Yes Yes No No
Weak Identification Test
- 10.379 11.789 11.485
Overidentification Test
Hansen's J statistics - 20.313 19.163 19.091
P-value - Chi(26) Chi(26) Chi(26)
- 0.777 0.830 0.833
 
Observations 66,398 63,084 63,084 63,084
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics
Hansen's J statistics
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation has provided a theoretical framework, empirical evidence, and an empir-
ical strategy for a better understanding of the seasonality of food insecurity in developing
countries, with a special attention to seasonal price changes of staple foods. Despite the
importance of the topic, little is known about the seasonal consumption patterns of rural
farmers in developing countries, and the seasonal aspect of food insecurity has received in-
sufficient attention in global efforts to combat rural poverty. This dissertation provides one
of the first comprehensive analyses aimed at understanding seasonal poverty in developing
countries. This thesis also estimates peer effects for a specific type of team where team
members’ interactions are complex: professional soccer teams.
Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical model to analyze how seasonal price changes of a
staple food affect farmers’ seasonal consumption in developing countries, where storage of
the staple food can be used to smooth consumption. In this situation, sharp increases in
the price of the staple food just before harvest can be viewed as a high return to savings,
and this has important implications for interpreting the consumption and savings behavior
of poor rural households. It is particularly worth noting that the reduced consumption in
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the hunger season in response to high prices at that time should not be interpreted only
as simple income and substitution effects. Rather, it could signal an inability to reallocate
resources across seasons. In addition, the findings of the model are also used to re-consider
the so-called “sell low, buy high” puzzle in rural areas of developing countries.
Chapter 3 empirically illustrates farmers’ heterogenous abilities to smooth consumption
during a crop year, by using three years of detailed weekly household panel data from rural
Zambia. Given seasonal price changes of the staple food, maize, some farmers buy it when
prices are low and store it for consumption during the hunger season, while others run out
of the staple food before the next harvest, and thus buy it when prices are high. Results
indicate that the former group successfully smooths its consumption, while the latter group
reduces consumption during the hunger season in response to a negative harvest at the
end of the previous crop year, and the effect of these negative harvest shocks produces an
inverse U consumption pattern during the crop year, especially for farmers with few assets.
These farmers reduce their food diversity to maintain consumption of the staple food in the
hunger season in spite of its price hike in that season.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the network approach can be used to analyze complex in-
teractions among several agents. By using a longitudinal data set of all soccer players in
the top German league (the Bundesliga) over the course of ten seasons (2000/01-2009/10),
causal peer effects during soccer games are identified by applying the econometric tech-
nique of spatial dynamic panel data estimation with fixed effects (the network approach).
Three major conclusions are drawn: (1) There are positive endogenous peer effects from
teammates, but the extent of the impacts varies depending on the nature of the task (the
impacts for goal keepers differs from the impacts for all other positions); (2) In contrast,
there are negative endogenous peer effects from opponent players onto defense players,
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mid-fielders, and forward players, although slightly positive effects for goal keepers; (3)
There are negative impacts of ethnic diversity among offensive players (mid-fielders and
forward players) that are mitigated over time, but no such effects for defensive players.
The conclusions in each chapter of this dissertation provide many insights into poli-
cies to reduce, and future studies of, seasonal poverty in developing countries. The essay
in Chapter 2 emphasizes that, in settings where produced consumption goods are used to
smooth consumption, theoretical models of farmers’ savings should include saving in the
form of stocks of agricultural output. The essay in Chapter 3 has important implications for
poverty reduction programs that offer short-term credit to farmers, because farmers’ het-
erogenous abilities to smooth consumption are related to their heterogenous motivations in
using credit programs: consumption vs. investment. Optimal schemes, repayment terms,
and the timing of offers of credit programs should differ depending on different motivations
for using such programs, and different credit programs should be designed to suit the pur-
poses of both farmers who are able to smooth consumption over the crop year and farmers
that are unable to smooth their consumption. The essay in Chapter 3 also suggests that
mirconutrient deficiency problems in developing countries should be part of any discussion
of the problem of seasonal price changes of staple foods. Finally, the essay in Chapter 4
suggests a potential approach for the analysis of the interactions among several markets in
developing countries, which is the analysis of efficiency of the interactions among markets,
relating to seasonal price changes. Although the identification of such interactions is not an
easy task, the network approach could solve the potential identification problem. To date,
the literature in this area is sparse, but the contribution of this dissertation will be valuable
if future work builds on it.
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Appendix A
Theoretical Framework
A.1 The Basic Two-period (two-season) Model
A.1.1 The Basic Two-period (two-season) Model
Start with the the two-period model with two goods discussed in Chapter 2 with an addi-
tional constraint of equation (A.5), 1 so that the model becomes:
max
c1;x1;c2;x2;B;S
U(c1; x1; c2; x2) (A.1)
subject to p1c1 + x1 + p1S = y1 +B (A.2)
p2c2 + x2 + (1 + r)B = p2(1  )S + y2 (A.3)
B  B (A.4)
q2 = c2   (1  )S  0 (A.5)
where cj is a produced consumption good (maize) in season j with price pj , xj is a non-
produced consumption good in season j with a time invariant price, normalized to one, S
1To simplify notation, u(c1; x1 j 1) + u(c2; x2 j 2) is replaced by U(c1; x1; c2; x2).
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is the physical amount of the staple food stored in season 1, B is borrowing in the form of
money, with an upper limit B, yj is income at the beginning of each season j, including
the value of the staple food produced, q2 is the amount of maize the farmer buys in season
2, r is a constant per season interest rate, and  is the physical depreciation rate of maize
storage. Equation (A.5) represents the situation in which transaction costs of maize selling
in the hunger season (season 2) are so large that there is no maize selling during the season.
Assume that p2 > p1 and p2 is sufficiently high to satisfy:
p2
p1
(1  ) > 1 + r (A.6)
This modification of the model leads to the different consumption patterns between BH
farmers and NBH farmers.
A.1.2 Solution of the Utility Maximization Problem
The utility maximization problem for the farmer is to maximize (A.1) subject to (A.2)-
(A.5). The solution of the problem can be divided into two cases: (1) q2 > 0, representing
the farmer who buys maize at higher prices (BH); (2) q2 = 0, representing the farmer who
does not buy maize at higher prices (NBH).
The Farmer Who Buys Maize at Higher Prices (BH: q2 > 0)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) by substituting out S, the following intertemporal budget con-
straint equation is derived:
p2
p1
(1  )[p1c1 + x1] + p2c2 + x2
=
p2
p1
(1  )[y1 +B] + y2   (1 + r)B (A.7)
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This farmer maximizes equation (A.1) subject to (A.7) and (A.4). Given equation (A.7),
maximized utility can be achieved by borrowing money up to the limit, that is, equation
(A.4) binds.
B = B (A.8)
This farmer borrows as much money as the borrowing constraint allows, because he or she
can save money by borrowing as much as possible at interest rate r to purchase as much
maize as possible in season 1. Substituting (A.8) into (A.7), the inter-temporal budget
constraint becomes:
p2
p1
(1  )[p1c1 + x1] + p2c2 + x2
=
p2
p1
(1  )[y1 + B] + y2   (1 + r) B (A.9)
The right hand side of equation (A.9) represents the full income of the farmer for the whole
year. Note that the cash in hand in season 1, y1+ B, is weighted by p2p1 (1 ), while cash in
hand in season 2, y2, is not. This means that high prices of maize in season 2, p2p1 (1 ), can
be viewed as a high return to savings, and thus, cash in hand in season 1 is more valuable
than cash in hand in season 2. For BH farmers, the loss of cash in hand in season 1 requires
a larger increase of cash in hand in season 2 to maintain the same inter-temporal budget
constraint, and thus, consumption smoothing through the rainy season labor supply will be
difficult.
The utility maximization problem for the farmer is reduced to maximizing (A.1) subject
to (A.9). Define   0 as the Lagrange multipliers which correspond to equations (A.9).
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Then the first order conditions for this problem are:
 w.r.t c1 @U
@c1
= p2(1  ) (A.10)
 w.r.t x1 @U
@x1
=
p2
p1
(1  ) (A.11)
 w.r.t c2 @U
@c2
= p2 (A.12)
 w.r.t x2 @U
@x2
=  (A.13)
where  > 0. Note that p2(1  ); p2p1 (1  ); p2, and 1 can be interpreted as shadow prices
of c1; x1; c2; x2 in the sense that marginal rate of substitution between any two goods is
equalized to the ratio of their shadow prices.
The Farmer Who Does Not Buy Maize at Higher Prices (NBH: q2 = 0)
This farmer saves enough maize for self-consumption, which provides for all of his or her
consumption during season 2 (c2 = (1   )S). For additional savings to purchase non-
staple food or non-food items, he or she saves in the form of money (even though saving
maize has a high return) due to the prohibitively high transaction costs of maize selling
during season 2.2 First, consider the case where equation (A.4) is not binding (i.e. B < B).
Combining equations (A.2), (A.3) and (A.5) with equality by substituting out B, the inter-
temporal budget constraint becomes:
p1c1 + x1 +
p1
1   c2 +
1
1 + r
x2 = y1 +
y2
1 + r
(A.14)
The right hand side of equation (A.14) represents the full income of the farmer. Note that
the cash in hand in season 1, y1+ B, is no more weighted by p2p1 (1 ), because high prices
of maize in season 2, p2
p1
(1  ), can no longer be viewed as a high return to savings.
2This saving implies that B < 0.
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The utility maximization problem for this type of farmer is reduced to maximizing (A.1)
subject to (A.14) and (A.4). Define   0 as the Lagrange multiplier which corresponds to
equation (A.14), then the first order conditions for this problem are:
 w.r.t c1 @U
@c1
= p1 (A.15)
 w.r.t x1 @U
@x1
=  (A.16)
 w.r.t c2 @U
@c2
=
p1
1    (A.17)
 w.r.t x2 @U
@x2
=
1
1 + r
 (A.18)
where  > 0, and p1; 1; p11  , and
1
1 r can be interpreted as shadow prices of c1; x1; c2; x2.
Demand functions cNBHt ; xNBHt (t = 1; 2) are determined by equations (A.14) and (A.15)-
(A.18). Since p2 plays no role in these shadow prices, the corresponding indirect utility
function does not change in response to any change in p2. The intuition here is that this
type of farmer does not buy maize in period 2, so the price of maize in that period has no
effect on his or her welfare. Note that these shadow prices for a NBH farmer are different
from those for a BH farmer. This implies that seasonal price changes of maize would affect
seasonal consumption differently for a BH farmer than for a NBH farmer.
In the case where equation (A.4) is binding (i.e. B = B), the first order conditions for
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this problem are:
 w.r.t c1 @U
@c1
=

p1 +
p1


 (A.19)
 w.r.t x1 @U
@x1
=

1 +



 (A.20)
 w.r.t c2 @U
@c2
=

p1
1   +
p1
1  



 (A.21)
 w.r.t x2 @U
@x2
=
1
1 + r
 (A.22)
where  is defined as the Lagrange multiplier which corresponds to equation (A.4),  > 0,
and  > 0. The shadow prices of goods consumed or purchased in season 1 (shadow prices
of c1; x1 and c2) increase, and the utility maximization problem of the farmer with a binding
borrowing constraint, B = B, can be re-written as follows:
max
c1;x1;c2;x2
U(c1; x1; c2; x2) (A.23)
subject to x1 + p1(c1 + c2) = y1 + B (A.24)
x2 + (1 + r) B = y2 (A.25)
The implication of a binding credit constraint (B = B) is that a NBH farmer with a binding
credit constraint wants to consume c1; x1 and c2 more, but not x2. In the empirical part of
this paper, a binding credit constraint of a NBH farmer is not taken into consideration, due
to data limitations. However, note that the focus of this paper is the high prices of staple
foods in the hunger season, and that such high prices do not affect a NBH farmer, regardless
of whether credit constraint is binding.
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Appendix B
Estimation results (Full version)
Table B.1 reports all the coefficients of Table 3.4 , and Table B.2 reports all the coefficients
of Table 3.5 .
105
Table B.1: Estimation Results (Total Consumption) with HH Fixed Effects
VARIABLES Full Sample NBH BH NBH BH
(i) Income Shock * Month Dummy
May -0.275 -0.198 -0.363** -0.237 -0.361**
(0.185) (0.236) (0.160) (0.350) (0.158)
June -0.193 -0.142 -0.450*** -0.022 -0.459***
(0.139) (0.200) (0.118) (0.254) (0.119)
July -0.193 -0.130 -0.334*** -0.001 -0.340***
(0.152) (0.198) (0.087) (0.209) (0.072)
August -0.037 0.066 -0.321*** 0.104 -0.333***
(0.134) -0.142 (0.106) (0.181) (0.097)
September -0.143 -0.020 -0.399** -0.184 -0.404**
(0.185) (0.272) (0.183) (0.313) (0.172)
Octobor -0.062 0.016 -0.232 0.035 -0.237
(0.131) (0.176) (0.151) (0.244) (0.159)
November -0.277* -0.152 -0.840 -0.142 -0.806*
(0.153) (0.150) (0.492) (0.202) (0.459)
December -0.189 -0.072 -0.180 -0.172 -0.200
(0.179) (0.245) (0.121) (0.283) (0.126)
January -0.046 0.008 -0.096 0.074 -0.100
(0.174) (0.277) (0.105) (0.345) (0.113)
February -0.071 -0.023 -0.271* -0.134 -0.393***
(0.144) (0.207) (0.144) (0.281) (0.093)
March -0.056 0.028 -0.418*** 0.057 -0.529***
(0.119) (0.180) (0.116) (0.243) (0.145)
April -0.272 -0.016 -1.483 -0.149 -1.367*
(0.182) (0.233) (0.869) (0.303) (0.793)
(ii) Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.010 0.004
(0.034) (0.105)
June -0.035 0.035
(0.027) (0.165)
July -0.032* -0.051
(0.018) (0.171)
August -0.010 0.098
(0.023) (0.156)
September 0.043 0.050
(0.027) (0.121)
Octobor -0.006 0.050
(0.023) (0.135)
November -0.003 -0.011
(0.023) (0.153)
December 0.027 0.093
(0.022) (0.098)
January -0.019 0.053
(0.030) (0.112)
February 0.030 0.277***
(0.026) (0.096)
March -0.009 0.242**
(0.025) (0.107)
April 0.033 -0.131
(0.025) (0.189)
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June -0.103 -0.057 -0.168 -0.057 -0.171
(0.081) (0.103) (0.113) (0.103) (0.112)
July 0.093 0.224 -0.189 0.225 -0.188
(0.196) (0.270) (0.142) (0.269) (0.144)
August -0.084 -0.026 -0.168 -0.026 -0.174
(0.098) (0.125) (0.159) (0.125) (0.160)
September 0.044 0.139 -0.184 0.138 -0.192
(0.154) (0.207) (0.170) (0.206) (0.171)
Octobor -0.223*** -0.250** -0.181 -0.251** -0.188
(0.078) (0.100) (0.148) (0.100) (0.149)
November -0.164* -0.209** 0.000 -0.211** -0.007
(0.089) (0.103) (0.214) (0.103) (0.217)
December -0.115 -0.098 -0.196 -0.098 -0.204
(0.087) (0.111) (0.143) (0.111) (0.141)
January -0.096 -0.030 -0.308** -0.032 -0.316**
(0.086) (0.115) (0.119) (0.114) (0.118)
Total Consumption
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Table B.1 Estimation Results (Total Consumption) with HH Fixed Effects: Continued
VARIABLES Full Sample NBH BH NBH BH
February -0.084 -0.068 -0.126 -0.066 -0.138
(0.109) (0.139) (0.195) (0.139) (0.192)
March 0.044 0.075 -0.013 0.074 -0.025
(0.090) (0.099) (0.208) (0.099) (0.207)
April -0.163* -0.138 -0.070 -0.137 -0.076
(0.081) (0.097) (0.184) (0.097) (0.189)
Month Dummy (09/10 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.254** 0.299* 0.208*** 0.305* 0.212***
(0.099) (0.160) (0.071) (0.162) (0.072)
July 0.074 0.062 0.101 0.065 0.102
(0.104) (0.163) (0.071) (0.163) (0.074)
August 0.019 0.038 -0.046 0.038 -0.041
(0.090) (0.131) (0.100) (0.132) (0.102)
September 0.017 0.009 0.029 0.014 0.033
(0.103) (0.172) (0.079) (0.171) (0.081)
Octobor -0.114* -0.143 -0.062 -0.144 -0.059
(0.060) (0.088) (0.081) (0.089) (0.083)
November -0.119* -0.151 -0.061 -0.152 -0.068
(0.071) (0.091) (0.142) (0.092) (0.147)
December 0.124 0.145 -0.004 0.147 0.003
(0.106) (0.151) (0.145) (0.151) (0.150)
January 0.085 0.101 0.069 0.097 0.073
(0.110) (0.167) (0.136) (0.169) (0.141)
February 0.101 0.125 0.090 0.127 0.125
(0.083) (0.122) (0.148) (0.121) (0.142)
March 0.105 0.137 0.069 0.135 0.102
(0.071) (0.096) (0.116) (0.096) (0.123)
April -0.025 -0.072 0.046 -0.068 0.019
(0.069) (0.093) (0.105) (0.092) (0.106)
Month Dummy (10/11 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June -0.108 -0.130 0.210* -0.133 0.205*
(0.078) (0.089) (0.110) (0.089) (0.104)
July -0.028 -0.024 0.174 -0.028 0.201
(0.133) (0.163) (0.153) (0.163) (0.134)
August -0.085 -0.085 0.150 -0.088 0.129
(0.077) (0.090) (0.157) (0.091) (0.161)
September -0.001 -0.014 0.224 -0.010 0.208
(0.112) (0.131) (0.221) (0.132) (0.225)
Octobor -0.124 -0.142 0.010 -0.144 -0.008
(0.106) (0.120) (0.211) (0.120) (0.211)
November -0.109 -0.168** 0.457 -0.169** 0.432
(0.079) (0.081) (0.503) (0.081) (0.500)
December 0.434** 0.477** 0.099 0.479** 0.079
(0.202) (0.229) (0.181) (0.229) (0.179)
January -0.098 -0.092 -0.128 -0.095 -0.146
(0.097) (0.115) (0.152) (0.114) (0.150)
February 0.018 -0.001 0.169 0.001 0.164
(0.113) (0.132) (0.182) (0.133) (0.148)
March -0.014 -0.034 0.237 -0.036 0.237
(0.108) (0.121) (0.185) (0.121) (0.180)
April 0.122 0.023 1.316 0.026 1.273
(0.128) (0.097) (1.017) (0.098) (1.004)
Total Consumption
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Table B.1 Estimation Results (Total Consumption) with HH Fixed Effects: Continued
VARIABLES Full Sample NBH BH NBH BH
Month Dummy* Dummy=1 if growing maize in dry season
June 0.190** 0.185* 0.133 0.186* 0.120
(0.087) (0.106) (0.083) (0.105) (0.093)
July 0.026 -0.026 0.103 -0.028 0.109
(0.133) (0.180) (0.102) (0.179) (0.118)
August 0.106 0.052 0.284** 0.053 0.256*
(0.082) (0.095) (0.129) (0.096) (0.134)
September 0.050 0.017 0.144 0.015 0.133
(0.108) (0.144) (0.125) (0.144) (0.142)
Octobor 0.098 0.092 0.184* 0.094 0.173
(0.080) (0.100) (0.103) (0.100) (0.115)
November 0.173** 0.169** 0.264 0.171** 0.282
(0.077) (0.081) (0.165) (0.082) (0.191)
December 0.051 -0.001 0.300** -0.002 0.273*
(0.120) (0.153) (0.137) (0.153) (0.151)
January 0.128 0.109 0.197 0.113 0.185
(0.089) (0.114) (0.115) (0.113) (0.132)
February 0.058 0.052 0.100 0.050 -0.009
(0.086) (0.118) (0.156) (0.118) (0.153)
March 0.027 0.003 0.110 0.006 0.011
(0.073) (0.093) (0.134) (0.093) (0.152)
April 0.148 0.071 0.352 0.070 0.425*
(0.089) (0.081) (0.206) (0.081) (0.244)
Year-variant control variables
Number of cattle 0.021** 0.023*** -0.110*** 0.022** -0.112***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.027)
Month-variant control variables
Number of male HH member -0.145*** -0.159** -0.044 -0.159** -0.047
(0.045) (0.059) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058)
Number of female HH member -0.219*** -0.216*** -0.270** -0.216*** -0.256**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.101) (0.051) (0.105)
Number of child HH member (0-3 years) -0.134*** -0.109*** -0.063 -0.110*** -0.063
(0.041) (0.040) (0.084) (0.040) (0.086)
Number of child HH member (4-6 years) -0.187*** -0.231*** -0.220* -0.230*** -0.232*
(0.051) (0.058) (0.110) (0.057) (0.115)
Number of child HH member (7-9 years) -0.134** -0.217*** -0.328*** -0.212*** -0.358***
(0.053) (0.047) (0.072) (0.049) (0.105)
Number of child HH member (10-12 years) -0.106*** -0.109** -0.351*** -0.106** -0.364***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.074) (0.041) (0.082)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No
(i) F-statistics F(12,46) F(12,43) F(12,20) F(12,43) F(12,20)
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 0.84 0.84 21.42 0.54 17.45
p-value 0.6079 0.6092 0.0000 0.8746 0.0000
(ii) F-statistics F(12,43) F(12,20)
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 3.58 19.53
p-value 0.0010 0.0000
Observations 6,813 5,132 1,681 5,132 1,681
R-squared 0.178 0.203 0.182 0.204 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total Consumption
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Table B.2: Estimation Results (Staple Food, Other Food, Non Food) with HH Fixed Effects
VARIABLES Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
(i) Income Shock * Month Dummy
May 0.016 -0.200 -0.689 -0.130 -0.117 -0.807 0.070 -0.516* -0.951 0.034 -0.536* -0.803
(0.173) (0.235) (0.714) (0.242) (0.342) (1.042) (0.173) (0.252) (0.795) (0.186) (0.259) (0.771)
June 0.017 0.003 -0.901 0.118 0.098 -0.670 0.030 -0.744*** -0.765** 0.022 -0.785*** -0.696**
(0.158) (0.173) (0.715) (0.211) (0.220) (0.980) (0.145) (0.180) (0.331) (0.128) (0.196) (0.327)
July -0.147 0.041 -0.553 -0.013 0.135 -0.341 -0.044 -0.301*** -1.094*** -0.055 -0.323*** -1.043***
(0.165) (0.162) (0.721) (0.227) (0.191) (0.770) (0.141) (0.096) (0.316) (0.117) (0.091) (0.313)
August 0.031 -0.152 0.734 0.043 -0.119 0.847 -0.121 -0.309 -0.817** -0.135 -0.307 -0.861**
(0.127) (0.154) (0.599) (0.186) (0.167) (0.697) (0.137) (0.221) (0.380) (0.133) (0.209) (0.390)
September 0.176 -0.090 -0.283 0.071 -0.096 -1.009 -0.136 -0.280 -1.325 -0.212 -0.281 -1.175
(0.169) (0.173) (1.332) (0.190) (0.218) (1.344) (0.184) (0.173) (1.007) (0.194) (0.179) (0.904)
Octobor 0.101 -0.002 -0.132 0.100 0.051 -0.155 0.055 -0.388* -0.476 -0.005 -0.377 -0.394
(0.121) (0.163) (0.639) (0.155) (0.211) (0.831) (0.151) (0.204) (0.385) (0.149) (0.228) (0.370)
November 0.024 -0.253 -0.288 0.094 -0.228 -0.455 0.030 -0.578* -3.547 -0.044 -0.579* -3.172
(0.187) (0.160) (0.571) (0.212) (0.205) (0.736) (0.194) (0.292) (2.384) (0.165) (0.316) (2.128)
December 0.144 0.035 -0.859 0.224 -0.188 -1.040 -0.104 -0.383* 0.194 -0.087 -0.416* 0.122
(0.157) (0.220) (0.936) (0.207) (0.192) (1.163) (0.147) (0.193) (0.365) (0.145) (0.201) (0.331)
January -0.017 0.030 0.006 0.013 0.235 -0.220 0.020 -0.209* -0.058 0.056 -0.216* -0.146
(0.186) (0.378) (0.755) (0.225) (0.469) (0.886) (0.117) (0.110) (0.281) (0.126) (0.119) (0.274)
February 0.126 0.187 -0.935 0.058 0.094 -1.191 -0.238** -0.167 -0.631 -0.375*** -0.280* -0.738
(0.175) (0.178) (0.849) (0.227) (0.216) (1.048) (0.084) (0.185) (0.479) (0.126) (0.153) (0.444)
March -0.011 0.019 0.143 0.066 0.056 0.039 -0.185 -0.683*** -0.241 -0.218 -0.840*** -0.409
(0.186) (0.188) (0.567) (0.231) (0.227) (0.725) (0.133) (0.192) (0.403) (0.143) (0.276) (0.357)
April 0.174 0.003 -0.503 0.027 -0.041 -0.845 -0.278 -1.489* -4.245 -0.172 -1.456* -3.882
(0.169) (0.262) (0.632) (0.209) (0.307) (0.855) (0.165) (0.786) (3.059) (0.122) (0.744) (2.787)
(ii) Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.038 -0.020 0.025 0.100 0.140 -0.583*
(0.027) (0.037) (0.093) (0.087) (0.131) (0.295)
June -0.029 -0.026 -0.075 -0.052 0.268* -0.390
(0.027) (0.025) (0.139) (0.204) (0.131) (0.398)
July -0.032 -0.022 -0.055 -0.032 0.045 -0.354
(0.026) (0.022) (0.050) (0.198) (0.186) (0.401)
August -0.003 -0.008 -0.034 0.090 0.111 0.080
(0.020) (0.021) (0.108) (0.106) (0.198) (0.396)
September 0.028 0.003 0.186 0.217** 0.150 -0.603
(0.028) (0.027) (0.163) (0.098) (0.150) (0.392)
Octobor 0.001 -0.014 -0.001 0.141* 0.146 -0.417
(0.021) (0.024) (0.063) (0.081) (0.175) (0.298)
November -0.018 -0.006 0.037 0.160* 0.166 -0.882
(0.027) (0.033) (0.057) (0.089) (0.149) (0.525)
December -0.022 0.062* 0.043 0.001 0.247** -0.105
(0.021) (0.032) (0.072) (0.125) (0.113) (0.333)
January -0.008 -0.055 0.054 -0.015 0.178 -0.128
(0.025) (0.046) (0.078) (0.080) (0.116) (0.350)
February 0.019 0.027 0.062 0.303*** 0.383*** -0.067
(0.027) (0.025) (0.077) (0.079) (0.112) (0.355)
March -0.022 -0.009 0.022 0.097 0.442*** 0.036
(0.031) (0.026) (0.060) (0.077) (0.137) (0.340)
April 0.037* 0.012 0.080 -0.115 0.119 -0.836
(0.021) (0.026) (0.071) (0.103) (0.210) (0.661)
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.045 -0.062 -0.280 0.043 -0.061 -0.276 0.068 -0.150 -0.758 0.074 -0.164 -0.757
(0.086) (0.149) (0.470) (0.082) (0.150) (0.467) (0.086) (0.160) (0.921) (0.091) (0.157) (0.935)
July 0.214 -0.086 1.081 0.212 -0.084 1.083 0.075 -0.301** -0.496 0.080 -0.302** -0.497
(0.184) (0.208) (1.215) (0.184) (0.209) (1.215) (0.116) (0.121) (0.805) (0.120) (0.122) (0.816)
August 0.209 -0.165 -0.193 0.206 -0.164 -0.191 0.212 -0.216 -0.916 0.210 -0.228 -0.917
(0.128) (0.192) (0.593) (0.128) (0.192) (0.596) (0.178) (0.135) (1.089) (0.180) (0.134) (1.098)
September 0.053 -0.099 0.975 0.050 -0.098 0.974 0.200 -0.249* -0.896 0.192 -0.265* -0.880
(0.110) (0.166) (1.048) (0.110) (0.166) (1.046) (0.166) (0.135) (0.905) (0.170) (0.133) (0.922)
Octobor -0.126 -0.199 -0.674** -0.129 -0.198 -0.676** 0.125 -0.176** -0.898 0.119 -0.194** -0.881
(0.088) (0.173) (0.327) (0.087) (0.173) (0.328) (0.143) (0.084) (0.999) (0.147) (0.077) (1.014)
November -0.046 -0.180 -0.666* -0.050 -0.179 -0.665* 0.151 -0.226 0.261 0.146 -0.246 0.286
(0.104) (0.177) (0.390) (0.101) (0.177) (0.391) (0.120) (0.173) (1.165) (0.122) (0.170) (1.186)
December 0.044 -0.085 -0.463 0.041 -0.083 -0.460 0.255 -0.215 -1.186 0.254 -0.236* -1.177
(0.085) (0.159) (0.469) (0.083) (0.156) (0.471) (0.148) (0.132) (1.070) (0.151) (0.123) (1.084)
January 0.253*** -0.109 -0.469 0.250*** -0.112 -0.468 0.207* -0.468** -1.065 0.206* -0.490** -1.052
(0.082) (0.173) (0.421) (0.080) (0.170) (0.423) (0.106) (0.187) (0.920) (0.106) (0.181) (0.935)
February 0.200** -0.207 -0.312 0.200** -0.204 -0.310 0.210* -0.142 -0.855 0.202 -0.167 -0.845
(0.086) (0.155) (0.655) (0.086) (0.155) (0.655) (0.121) (0.176) (1.161) (0.121) (0.166) (1.175)
March 0.418*** 0.032 -0.599 0.415*** 0.032 -0.600 0.385** 0.018 -1.012 0.383** -0.010 -1.005
(0.134) (0.178) (0.405) (0.131) (0.178) (0.406) (0.161) (0.229) (1.087) (0.164) (0.219) (1.106)
April 0.143 -0.148 -0.757** 0.142 -0.146 -0.754** 0.178* -0.107 -0.540 0.177* -0.130 -0.516
(0.088) (0.158) (0.331) (0.087) (0.158) (0.332) (0.101) (0.175) (1.049) (0.101) (0.178) (1.075)
Month Dummy (09/10 Crop Year)
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Table B.2 Estimation Results (Staple Food, Other Food, Non Food) with HH Fixed
Effects: Continued
VARIABLES Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
Month Dummy (09/10 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.033 0.061 1.547** 0.040 0.063 1.562** 0.225 0.220 0.134 0.210 0.232 0.166
(0.108) (0.150) (0.753) (0.107) (0.151) (0.764) (0.132) (0.136) (0.206) (0.130) (0.138) (0.197)
July 0.045 -0.093 0.518 0.050 -0.094 0.525 0.110 0.035 0.257 0.100 0.032 0.295
(0.148) (0.157) (0.531) (0.147) (0.157) (0.530) (0.077) (0.057) (0.340) (0.076) (0.059) (0.338)
August -0.053 0.018 0.303 -0.050 0.015 0.303 0.001 -0.062 -0.111 -0.007 -0.065 -0.054
(0.126) (0.185) (0.527) (0.128) (0.185) (0.527) (0.161) (0.105) (0.405) (0.163) (0.110) (0.392)
September -0.211 0.085 0.312 -0.205 0.083 0.332 -0.058 0.098 0.047 -0.047 0.096 0.052
(0.130) (0.160) (0.673) (0.130) (0.159) (0.670) (0.127) (0.087) (0.270) (0.128) (0.094) (0.282)
Octobor -0.280*** 0.047 -0.334 -0.278*** 0.043 -0.339 -0.143 0.059 -0.199 -0.138 0.048 -0.163
(0.098) (0.116) (0.282) (0.100) (0.116) (0.283) (0.083) (0.119) (0.356) (0.081) (0.123) (0.349)
November -0.237** -0.017 -0.315 -0.236** -0.020 -0.314 -0.194* 0.058 -0.075 -0.186 0.051 -0.113
(0.113) (0.152) (0.245) (0.114) (0.151) (0.249) (0.113) (0.223) (0.373) (0.116) (0.228) (0.382)
December -0.140 0.350** 0.252 -0.140 0.355** 0.252 -0.012 0.086 -0.229 -0.025 0.087 -0.157
(0.132) (0.165) (0.479) (0.135) (0.161) (0.485) (0.122) (0.216) (0.375) (0.125) (0.221) (0.376)
January 0.137 0.314 -0.554 0.138 0.304 -0.553 0.013 0.167 -0.063 -0.007 0.163 0.016
(0.149) (0.249) (0.360) (0.150) (0.252) (0.358) (0.101) (0.199) (0.312) (0.102) (0.203) (0.311)
February 0.040 0.116 0.346 0.044 0.115 0.346 0.016 0.018 0.454 0.043 0.043 0.536
(0.126) (0.164) (0.426) (0.127) (0.161) (0.428) (0.108) (0.205) (0.645) (0.107) (0.205) (0.662)
March 0.232 0.238** -0.350 0.232 0.235** -0.354 0.042 0.166 -0.132 0.041 0.204 -0.030
(0.150) (0.112) (0.346) (0.152) (0.111) (0.346) (0.100) (0.232) (0.320) (0.107) (0.245) (0.321)
April -0.065 0.046 -0.403* -0.056 0.046 -0.398* -0.083 0.144 0.078 -0.119 0.131 0.035
(0.101) (0.133) (0.226) (0.101) (0.130) (0.227) (0.121) (0.207) (0.264) (0.120) (0.211) (0.296)
Month Dummy (10/11 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.078 -0.191** -0.444 0.072 -0.191** -0.451 0.051 0.272 0.407 0.070 0.247 0.406
(0.078) (0.090) (0.429) (0.075) (0.092) (0.432) (0.156) (0.160) (0.657) (0.139) (0.150) (0.653)
July 0.003 -0.174 0.319 -0.005 -0.174 0.312 0.109 0.022 0.735 0.134 0.058 0.739
(0.093) (0.117) (0.780) (0.093) (0.118) (0.777) (0.297) (0.149) (0.684) (0.279) (0.159) (0.710)
August -0.010 -0.101 -0.217 -0.015 -0.100 -0.225 0.212 0.108 0.118 0.193 0.106 0.044
(0.075) (0.124) (0.407) (0.074) (0.124) (0.407) (0.274) (0.287) (0.953) (0.282) (0.315) (0.913)
September 0.149 -0.004 -0.416 0.148 -0.001 -0.396 0.426** -0.133 0.713 0.405** -0.158 0.738
(0.114) (0.104) (0.540) (0.115) (0.104) (0.543) (0.176) (0.239) (0.925) (0.173) (0.242) (0.937)
Octobor -0.203*** 0.054 -0.527 -0.208*** 0.054 -0.531 0.259 0.027 -0.612 0.250 -0.014 -0.583
(0.067) (0.099) (0.511) (0.065) (0.098) (0.513) (0.412) (0.211) (0.728) (0.399) (0.214) (0.728)
November -0.128* -0.007 -0.689** -0.135* -0.006 -0.687** -0.237 0.165 2.842 -0.241 0.124 2.810
(0.073) (0.112) (0.269) (0.070) (0.113) (0.270) (0.329) (0.187) (2.447) (0.318) (0.185) (2.419)
December 0.045 0.709*** 0.850 0.037 0.719*** 0.854 -0.096 0.590 -0.770 -0.112 0.547 -0.738
(0.100) (0.158) (0.974) (0.097) (0.157) (0.978) (0.177) (0.384) (0.826) (0.174) (0.382) (0.797)
January -0.095 0.149 -0.727 -0.101 0.143 -0.723 -0.283 0.145 -0.502 -0.311 0.106 -0.444
(0.072) (0.115) (0.484) (0.070) (0.113) (0.484) (0.278) (0.240) (0.721) (0.283) (0.247) (0.707)
February -0.038 0.079 -0.133 -0.040 0.084 -0.127 0.179 0.093 0.349 0.176 0.066 0.398
(0.079) (0.122) (0.587) (0.079) (0.122) (0.590) (0.167) (0.226) (0.946) (0.168) (0.200) (0.940)
March -0.033 0.161 -0.559 -0.039 0.161 -0.560 0.008 0.510 0.034 -0.003 0.497 0.096
(0.088) (0.132) (0.459) (0.087) (0.132) (0.459) (0.164) (0.328) (0.792) (0.164) (0.336) (0.775)
April -0.075 0.093 0.065 -0.075 0.096 0.072 -0.067 1.479 4.067 -0.108 1.432 4.030
(0.083) (0.113) (0.328) (0.083) (0.114) (0.328) (0.175) (0.893) (3.474) (0.183) (0.888) (3.444)
Month Dummy* Dummy=1 if growing maize
in dry season
June 0.091 0.173* 0.433 0.093 0.173* 0.436 -0.037 0.282* 0.126 0.012 0.241 0.043
(0.083) (0.096) (0.478) (0.079) (0.097) (0.478) (0.130) (0.155) (0.436) (0.140) (0.164) (0.424)
July 0.019 0.047 -0.327 0.019 0.046 -0.332 -0.020 0.330*** -0.223 0.017 0.348*** -0.322
(0.129) (0.130) (0.793) (0.126) (0.130) (0.793) (0.145) (0.098) (0.514) (0.175) (0.116) (0.525)
August -0.054 0.162 0.003 -0.052 0.162 0.006 -0.094 0.504*** 0.565 -0.082 0.520*** 0.326
(0.099) (0.139) (0.422) (0.098) (0.139) (0.421) (0.158) (0.125) (0.613) (0.174) (0.139) (0.596)
September 0.061 0.068 -0.219 0.060 0.067 -0.227 -0.122 0.277** 0.403 -0.164 0.288** 0.401
(0.167) (0.116) (0.565) (0.167) (0.115) (0.566) (0.138) (0.110) (0.536) (0.146) (0.135) (0.598)
Octobor 0.006 0.078 0.329 0.007 0.079 0.334 -0.095 0.268** 0.602 -0.108 0.287** 0.513
(0.082) (0.116) (0.350) (0.083) (0.116) (0.350) (0.155) (0.096) (0.568) (0.162) (0.116) (0.601)
November 0.022 0.231** 0.341 0.026 0.231** 0.341 0.013 0.330* 0.665 -0.010 0.342 0.794
(0.091) (0.113) (0.300) (0.089) (0.113) (0.299) (0.133) (0.173) (0.749) (0.158) (0.198) (0.838)
December 0.074 0.040 -0.283 0.077 0.035 -0.283 -0.038 0.528*** 0.465 0.007 0.508** 0.255
(0.097) (0.163) (0.555) (0.094) (0.164) (0.556) (0.167) (0.176) (0.585) (0.195) (0.190) (0.583)
January -0.027 0.033 0.626 -0.024 0.039 0.626 -0.067 0.353** 0.388 -0.007 0.357* 0.169
(0.095) (0.150) (0.393) (0.093) (0.147) (0.391) (0.128) (0.163) (0.494) (0.159) (0.182) (0.510)
February -0.004 0.062 0.156 -0.005 0.057 0.156 -0.056 0.347* -0.203 -0.138 0.262 -0.440
(0.091) (0.131) (0.495) (0.091) (0.130) (0.494) (0.139) (0.193) (0.697) (0.136) (0.215) (0.736)
March 0.057 -0.088 0.122 0.061 -0.088 0.128 0.046 0.158 0.128 0.053 0.040 -0.163
(0.097) (0.130) (0.355) (0.097) (0.130) (0.353) (0.106) (0.220) (0.527) (0.119) (0.266) (0.531)
April -0.155* 0.095 0.527* -0.155* 0.093 0.530* 0.138 0.203 1.244 0.244 0.235 1.356
(0.078) (0.114) (0.282) (0.078) (0.114) (0.282) (0.167) (0.223) (0.740) (0.206) (0.258) (0.870)
Year-variant control variables
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Table B.2 Estimation Results (Staple Food, Other Food, Non Food) with HH Fixed
Effects: Continued
VARIABLES Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food Staple Food Other Food Non Food
Year-variant control variables
Number of cattle 0.011 0.033** 0.021 0.011 0.034** 0.014 -0.018 -0.116*** -0.307** -0.020 -0.121*** -0.303**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.028) (0.008) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.034) (0.109) (0.018) (0.032) (0.112)
Month-variant control variables
Number of male HH member -0.048 -0.214*** -0.265 -0.048 -0.216*** -0.260 -0.106** -0.103 0.258 -0.116** -0.104 0.264
(0.035) (0.071) (0.205) (0.035) (0.072) (0.208) (0.050) (0.071) (0.182) (0.052) (0.076) (0.187)
Number of female HH member -0.189*** -0.260*** -0.157 -0.188*** -0.262*** -0.157 -0.333*** -0.424*** 0.289 -0.313*** -0.404*** 0.277
(0.041) (0.072) (0.201) (0.041) (0.074) (0.202) (0.087) (0.103) (0.450) (0.083) (0.119) (0.437)
Number of child HH member (0-3 years) -0.087** -0.094** -0.202 -0.087** -0.096** -0.203 0.049 -0.040 -0.380 0.046 -0.037 -0.385
(0.040) (0.045) (0.139) (0.041) (0.045) (0.140) (0.065) (0.086) (0.335) (0.064) (0.083) (0.342)
Number of child HH member (4-6 years) -0.211*** -0.195*** -0.373** -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.366** -0.066 -0.281* -0.410 -0.069 -0.326* -0.352
(0.054) (0.070) (0.175) (0.054) (0.068) (0.175) (0.109) (0.157) (0.294) (0.110) (0.165) (0.277)
Number of child HH member (7-9 years) -0.159*** -0.221*** -0.343*** -0.158*** -0.221*** -0.311** -0.168* -0.424*** -0.436** -0.205** -0.525*** -0.265
(0.050) (0.067) (0.110) (0.055) (0.067) (0.126) (0.085) (0.090) (0.194) (0.096) (0.123) (0.294)
Number of child HH member (10-12 years) -0.118** -0.082* -0.161 -0.117** -0.084* -0.141 -0.183*** -0.473*** -0.413* -0.199*** -0.515*** -0.340
(0.050) (0.043) (0.156) (0.051) (0.047) (0.151) (0.050) (0.118) (0.206) (0.048) (0.124) (0.201)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No No No No No No No No
(i) F-statstics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 0.80 0.83 1.14 0.59 0.64 1.01 5.68 7.08 14.57 5.61 13.13 16.29
p-value 0.6454 0.6209 0.3545 0.8340 0.8003 0.4573 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
(ii) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 4.24 3.21 0.77 32.58 7.58 2.84
p-value 0.0002 0.0024 0.6744 0.0000 0.0000 0.0190
Observations 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.189 0.246 0.086 0.191 0.248 0.086 0.314 0.229 0.097 0.324 0.234 0.100
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NBH BH
F(12,43) F(12,20)
F(12,43) F(12,20)
111
Appendix C
Estimation results (Robustness Checks)
Table C.1 reports all the coefficients of Table 3.6, and Table C.2 reports estimation results
without adjusting adult equivalent scale.
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Table C.1: Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects)
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
Income Shock * Month Dummy
May -0.130 -0.117 -0.807 0.034 -0.536* -0.803
(0.242) (0.342) (1.042) (0.186) (0.259) (0.771)
June 0.118 0.248 0.243 0.098 0.215 0.227 -0.670 0.137 0.139 0.022 -0.012 -0.018 -0.785*** -0.249 -0.225 -0.696** 0.107 0.243
(0.211) (0.167) (0.220) (0.349) (0.980) (0.937) (0.128) (0.144) (0.196) (0.183) (0.327) (0.766)
July -0.013 0.117 0.100 0.135 0.252 0.272 -0.341 0.466 0.408 -0.055 -0.089 -0.110 -0.323*** 0.213 0.235 -1.043*** -0.240 0.068
(0.227) (0.236) (0.191) (0.363) (0.770) (0.825) (0.117) (0.236) (0.091) (0.225) (0.313) (0.728)
August 0.043 0.173 0.180 -0.119 -0.002 0.015 0.847 1.654 1.739* -0.135 -0.169 -0.184 -0.307 0.229 0.201 -0.861** -0.058 0.000
(0.186) (0.233) (0.167) (0.346) (0.697) (0.911) (0.133) (0.237) (0.209) (0.352) (0.390) (0.963)
September 0.071 0.201 0.185 -0.096 0.021 0.004 -1.009 -0.202 -0.205 -0.212 -0.246 -0.252 -0.281 0.255 0.186 -1.175 -0.372 -0.585
(0.190) (0.256) (0.218) (0.304) (1.344) (0.831) (0.194) (0.180) (0.179) (0.246) (0.904) (1.067)
Octobor 0.100 0.230 0.191 0.051 0.168 0.120 -0.155 0.652 0.714 -0.005 -0.039 -0.050 -0.377 0.159 0.143 -0.394 0.409 0.324
(0.155) (0.227) (0.211) (0.335) (0.831) (0.769) (0.149) (0.216) (0.228) (0.155) (0.370) (0.805)
November 0.094 0.224 0.218 -0.228 -0.111 -0.150 -0.455 0.352 0.432 -0.044 -0.078 -0.074 -0.579* -0.043 -0.069 -3.172 -2.369 -2.549
(0.212) (0.341) (0.205) (0.266) (0.736) (0.635) (0.165) (0.241) (0.316) (0.213) (2.128) (2.198)
December 0.224 0.354 0.301 -0.188 -0.071 -0.115 -1.040 -0.233 -0.137 -0.087 -0.121 -0.118 -0.416* 0.120 0.104 0.122 0.925 0.924
(0.207) (0.302) (0.192) (0.367) (1.163) (0.825) (0.145) (0.143) (0.201) (0.335) (0.331) (0.850)
January 0.013 0.143 0.148 0.235 0.352 0.294 -0.220 0.587 0.714 0.056 0.022 0.034 -0.216* 0.320 0.318 -0.146 0.657 0.692
(0.225) (0.278) (0.469) (0.513) (0.886) (0.800) (0.126) (0.221) (0.119) (0.326) (0.274) (0.700)
February 0.058 0.188 0.192 0.094 0.211 0.133 -1.191 -0.384 -0.289 -0.375*** -0.409 -0.405** -0.280* 0.256 0.246 -0.738 0.065 0.066
(0.227) (0.264) (0.216) (0.327) (1.048) (0.786) (0.126) (0.183) (0.153) (0.273) (0.444) (0.993)
March 0.066 0.196 0.150 0.056 0.173 0.088 0.039 0.846 0.911 -0.218 -0.252 -0.244 -0.840*** -0.304 -0.319 -0.409 0.394 0.394
(0.231) (0.289) (0.227) (0.291) (0.725) (0.767) (0.143) (0.165) (0.276) (0.294) (0.357) (0.879)
April 0.027 0.157 0.154 -0.041 0.076 -0.007 -0.845 -0.038 0.200 -0.172 -0.206 -0.200 -1.456* -0.920 -0.923 -3.882 -3.079 -3.051
(0.209) (0.189) (0.307) (0.253) (0.855) (0.557) (0.122) (0.171) (0.744) (0.646) (2.787) (2.770)
Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.038 -0.020 0.025 0.100 0.140 -0.583*
(0.027) (0.037) (0.093) (0.087) (0.131) (0.295)
June -0.029 -0.067 -0.068*** -0.026 -0.006 -0.009 -0.075 -0.100 -0.110 -0.052 -0.152 -0.184 0.268* 0.128 0.136*** -0.390 0.193 0.265
(0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.036) (0.139) (0.142) (0.204) (0.164) (0.131) (0.047) (0.398) (0.199)
July -0.032 -0.070 -0.065*** -0.022 -0.002 -0.003 -0.055 -0.080 -0.079 -0.032 -0.132 -0.198 0.045 -0.095 -0.085 -0.354 0.229 0.418
(0.026) (0.019) (0.022) (0.035) (0.050) (0.094) (0.198) (0.192) (0.186) (0.116) (0.401) (0.256)
August -0.003 -0.041 -0.039 -0.008 0.012 0.011 -0.034 -0.059 -0.067 0.090 -0.010 -0.057 0.111 -0.029 -0.061 0.080 0.663 0.617**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.108) (0.126) (0.106) (0.072) (0.198) (0.130) (0.396) (0.264)
September 0.028 -0.010 -0.007 0.003 0.023 0.024 0.186 0.161 0.152 0.217** 0.117 0.117 0.150 0.010 -0.023 -0.603 -0.020 -0.140
(0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.163) (0.131) (0.098) (0.073) (0.150) (0.106) (0.392) (0.336)
Octobor 0.001 -0.037 -0.034 -0.014 0.006 0.009 -0.001 -0.026 -0.034 0.141* 0.041 0.062 0.146 0.006 -0.035 -0.417 0.166 -0.021
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.063) (0.068) (0.081) (0.091) (0.175) (0.095) (0.298) (0.242)
November -0.018 -0.056 -0.055 -0.006 0.014 0.016 0.037 0.012 -0.000 0.160* 0.060 0.079 0.166 0.026 -0.005 -0.882 -0.299 -0.421
(0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.057) (0.063) (0.089) (0.085) (0.149) (0.096) (0.525) (0.466)
December -0.022 -0.060 -0.054* 0.062* 0.082 0.081* 0.043 0.018 0.004 0.001 -0.099 -0.103 0.247** 0.107 0.072 -0.105 0.478 0.346
(0.021) (0.030) (0.032) (0.045) (0.072) (0.066) (0.125) (0.103) (0.113) (0.121) (0.333) (0.222)
January -0.008 -0.046 -0.045* -0.055 -0.035 -0.027 0.054 0.029 0.009 -0.015 -0.115 -0.093 0.178 0.038 0.014 -0.128 0.455 0.314
(0.025) (0.027) (0.046) (0.049) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.116) (0.098) (0.350) (0.254)
February 0.019 -0.019 -0.018 0.027 0.047 0.056 0.062 0.037 0.019 0.303*** 0.203 0.220*** 0.383*** 0.243 0.218 -0.067 0.516 0.386
(0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.036) (0.077) (0.067) (0.079) (0.072) (0.112) (0.128) (0.355) (0.275)
March -0.022 -0.060 -0.056 -0.009 0.011 0.021 0.022 -0.003 -0.018 0.097 -0.003 0.018 0.442*** 0.302 0.282* 0.036 0.619 0.498**
(0.031) (0.034) (0.026) (0.032) (0.060) (0.075) (0.077) (0.060) (0.137) (0.157) (0.340) (0.238)
April 0.037* -0.001 0.001 0.012 0.032 0.039 0.080 0.055 0.025 -0.115 -0.215 -0.183 0.119 -0.021 -0.054 -0.836 -0.253 -0.473
(0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) (0.071) (0.062) (0.103) (0.113) (0.210) (0.149) (0.661) (0.622)
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
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Table C.1 Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects): Continued
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.043 0.036 -0.061 -0.030 -0.276 -0.284 0.074 0.058 -0.164 -0.174 -0.757 -0.777
(0.082) (0.081) (0.150) (0.155) (0.467) (0.473) (0.091) (0.093) (0.157) (0.160) (0.935) (0.939)
July 0.212 0.209 -0.084 -0.080 1.083 1.116 0.080 0.063 -0.302** -0.304** -0.497 -0.475
(0.184) (0.189) (0.209) (0.211) (1.215) (1.247) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) (0.123) (0.816) (0.822)
August 0.206 0.166 -0.164 -0.185 -0.191 -0.199 0.210 0.195 -0.228 -0.213 -0.917 -0.817
(0.128) (0.130) (0.192) (0.196) (0.596) (0.609) (0.180) (0.182) (0.134) (0.133) (1.098) (1.106)
September 0.050 -0.000 -0.098 -0.138 0.974 0.997 0.192 0.155 -0.265* -0.234 -0.880 -0.722
(0.110) (0.112) (0.166) (0.170) (1.046) (1.061) (0.170) (0.173) (0.133) (0.139) (0.922) (0.958)
Octobor -0.129 -0.165* -0.198 -0.204 -0.676** -0.668** 0.119 0.090 -0.194** -0.186** -0.881 -0.866
(0.087) (0.087) (0.173) (0.178) (0.328) (0.325) (0.147) (0.146) (0.077) (0.088) (1.014) (1.009)
November -0.050 -0.060 -0.179 -0.165 -0.665* -0.651 0.146 0.117 -0.246 -0.243 0.286 0.258
(0.101) (0.104) (0.177) (0.184) (0.391) (0.390) (0.122) (0.114) (0.170) (0.184) (1.186) (1.194)
December 0.041 0.021 -0.083 -0.057 -0.460 -0.503 0.254 0.229 -0.236* -0.241* -1.177 -1.193
(0.083) (0.086) (0.156) (0.160) (0.471) (0.464) (0.151) (0.148) (0.123) (0.129) (1.084) (1.076)
January 0.250*** 0.233*** -0.112 -0.095 -0.468 -0.521 0.206* 0.173 -0.490** -0.500** -1.052 -1.080
(0.080) (0.084) (0.170) (0.174) (0.423) (0.440) (0.106) (0.103) (0.181) (0.194) (0.935) (0.929)
February 0.200** 0.189** -0.204 -0.177 -0.310 -0.372 0.202 0.172 -0.167 -0.175 -0.845 -0.878
(0.086) (0.086) (0.155) (0.158) (0.655) (0.682) (0.121) (0.119) (0.166) (0.165) (1.175) (1.165)
March 0.415*** 0.381*** 0.032 0.049 -0.600 -0.679 0.383** 0.350** -0.010 -0.016 -1.005 -1.046
(0.131) (0.126) (0.178) (0.185) (0.406) (0.420) (0.164) (0.158) (0.219) (0.219) (1.106) (1.097)
April 0.142 0.100 -0.146 -0.113 -0.754** -0.886** 0.177* 0.143 -0.130 -0.138 -0.516 -0.565
(0.087) (0.085) (0.158) (0.165) (0.332) (0.386) (0.101) (0.107) (0.178) (0.184) (1.075) (1.047)
Month Dummy (09/10 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.040 0.050 0.063 0.092 1.562** 1.567** 0.210 0.201 0.232 0.218 0.166 0.157
(0.107) (0.103) (0.151) (0.152) (0.764) (0.761) (0.130) (0.131) (0.138) (0.139) (0.197) (0.209)
July 0.050 0.036 -0.094 -0.095 0.525 0.572 0.100 0.109 0.032 0.040 0.295 0.261
(0.147) (0.148) (0.157) (0.156) (0.530) (0.535) (0.076) (0.075) (0.059) (0.057) (0.338) (0.342)
August -0.050 -0.070 0.015 0.022 0.303 0.285 -0.007 -0.015 -0.065 -0.100 -0.054 -0.161
(0.128) (0.124) (0.185) (0.188) (0.527) (0.528) (0.163) (0.170) (0.110) (0.125) (0.392) (0.403)
September -0.205 -0.218* 0.083 0.074 0.332 0.331 -0.047 -0.093 0.096 0.033 0.052 -0.027
(0.130) (0.128) (0.159) (0.159) (0.670) (0.673) (0.128) (0.134) (0.094) (0.099) (0.282) (0.302)
Octobor -0.278*** -0.290*** 0.043 0.057 -0.339 -0.324 -0.138 -0.190** 0.048 -0.077 -0.163 -0.439
(0.100) (0.095) (0.116) (0.125) (0.283) (0.289) (0.081) (0.091) (0.123) (0.136) (0.349) (0.294)
November -0.236** -0.249** -0.020 0.017 -0.314 -0.277 -0.186 -0.236* 0.051 -0.078 -0.113 -0.442
(0.114) (0.109) (0.151) (0.155) (0.249) (0.247) (0.116) (0.115) (0.228) (0.243) (0.382) (0.360)
December -0.140 -0.139 0.355** 0.399** 0.252 0.268 -0.025 -0.074 0.087 -0.036 -0.157 -0.484
(0.135) (0.127) (0.161) (0.161) (0.485) (0.489) (0.125) (0.119) (0.221) (0.229) (0.376) (0.335)
January 0.138 0.138 0.304 0.359 -0.553 -0.562 -0.007 -0.055 0.163 0.039 0.016 -0.314
(0.150) (0.144) (0.252) (0.235) (0.358) (0.365) (0.102) (0.096) (0.203) (0.227) (0.311) (0.258)
February 0.044 0.039 0.115 0.166 0.346 0.318 0.043 0.003 0.043 -0.077 0.536 0.175
(0.127) (0.117) (0.161) (0.157) (0.428) (0.417) (0.107) (0.117) (0.205) (0.219) (0.662) (0.616)
March 0.232 0.248* 0.235** 0.288** -0.354 -0.361 0.041 0.002 0.204 0.084 -0.030 -0.392
(0.152) (0.144) (0.111) (0.114) (0.346) (0.354) (0.107) (0.120) (0.245) (0.253) (0.321) (0.266)
April -0.056 -0.055 0.046 0.124 -0.398* -0.400 -0.119 -0.159 0.131 0.003 0.035 -0.409
(0.101) (0.090) (0.130) (0.120) (0.227) (0.248) (0.120) (0.109) (0.211) (0.236) (0.296) (0.319)
Month Dummy (10/11 Crop Year)
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Table C.1 Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects): Continued
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
Month Dummy (10/11 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.072 0.068 -0.191** -0.181** -0.451 -0.479 0.070 0.072 0.247 0.217 0.406 0.283
(0.075) (0.075) (0.092) (0.089) (0.432) (0.425) (0.139) (0.136) (0.150) (0.156) (0.653) (0.608)
July -0.005 -0.008 -0.174 -0.184 0.312 0.334 0.134 0.161 0.058 0.049 0.739 0.499
(0.093) (0.097) (0.118) (0.116) (0.777) (0.777) (0.279) (0.246) (0.159) (0.165) (0.710) (0.671)
August -0.015 -0.029 -0.100 -0.106 -0.225 -0.273 0.193 0.234 0.106 0.163 0.044 -0.102
(0.074) (0.075) (0.124) (0.124) (0.407) (0.405) (0.282) (0.269) (0.315) (0.303) (0.913) (0.947)
September 0.148 0.133 -0.001 -0.009 -0.396 -0.423 0.405** 0.363* -0.158 -0.021 0.738 1.101
(0.115) (0.114) (0.104) (0.101) (0.543) (0.536) (0.173) (0.188) (0.242) (0.253) (0.937) (1.138)
Octobor -0.208*** -0.228*** 0.054 0.046 -0.531 -0.566 0.250 0.186 -0.014 0.037 -0.583 -0.369
(0.065) (0.067) (0.098) (0.095) (0.513) (0.506) (0.399) (0.381) (0.214) (0.236) (0.728) (0.705)
November -0.135* -0.147** -0.006 -0.003 -0.687** -0.711** -0.241 -0.318 0.124 0.182 2.810 3.101
(0.070) (0.071) (0.113) (0.108) (0.270) (0.267) (0.318) (0.320) (0.185) (0.198) (2.419) (2.590)
December 0.037 0.020 0.719*** 0.708*** 0.854 0.851 -0.112 -0.175 0.547 0.602 -0.738 -0.552
(0.097) (0.097) (0.157) (0.155) (0.978) (0.971) (0.174) (0.165) (0.382) (0.379) (0.797) (0.757)
January -0.101 -0.121 0.143 0.143 -0.723 -0.750 -0.311 -0.389 0.106 0.152 -0.444 -0.282
(0.070) (0.074) (0.113) (0.104) (0.484) (0.481) (0.283) (0.289) (0.247) (0.249) (0.707) (0.624)
February -0.040 -0.052 0.084 0.104 -0.127 -0.135 0.176 0.109 0.066 0.122 0.398 0.625
(0.079) (0.079) (0.122) (0.112) (0.590) (0.582) (0.168) (0.178) (0.200) (0.197) (0.940) (0.997)
March -0.039 -0.064 0.161 0.176 -0.560 -0.605 -0.003 -0.074 0.497 0.554* 0.096 0.322
(0.087) (0.084) (0.132) (0.127) (0.459) (0.456) (0.164) (0.163) (0.336) (0.318) (0.775) (0.819)
April -0.075 -0.121 0.096 0.139 0.072 -0.048 -0.108 -0.178 1.432 1.479 4.030 4.195
(0.083) (0.081) (0.114) (0.110) (0.328) (0.326) (0.183) (0.191) (0.888) (0.875) (3.444) (3.561)
Month Dummy* Dummy=1 if growing maize in dry season
June 0.093 0.095 0.173* 0.164 0.436 0.484 0.012 0.017 0.241 0.241 0.043 0.021
(0.079) (0.078) (0.097) (0.100) (0.478) (0.479) (0.140) (0.140) (0.164) (0.163) (0.424) (0.423)
July 0.019 0.023 0.046 0.061 -0.332 -0.374 0.017 0.014 0.348*** 0.326*** -0.322 -0.390
(0.126) (0.126) (0.130) (0.132) (0.793) (0.804) (0.175) (0.173) (0.116) (0.114) (0.525) (0.502)
August -0.052 -0.034 0.162 0.173 0.006 0.004 -0.082 -0.073 0.520*** 0.481*** 0.326 0.226
(0.098) (0.093) (0.139) (0.140) (0.421) (0.427) (0.174) (0.177) (0.139) (0.128) (0.596) (0.579)
September 0.060 0.082 0.067 0.108 -0.227 -0.240 -0.164 -0.124 0.288** 0.255* 0.401 0.183
(0.167) (0.166) (0.115) (0.117) (0.566) (0.565) (0.146) (0.153) (0.135) (0.137) (0.598) (0.572)
Octobor 0.007 0.026 0.079 0.109 0.334 0.325 -0.108 -0.066 0.287** 0.313** 0.513 0.494
(0.083) (0.078) (0.116) (0.120) (0.350) (0.355) (0.162) (0.161) (0.116) (0.127) (0.601) (0.555)
November 0.026 0.031 0.231** 0.243** 0.341 0.303 -0.010 0.040 0.342 0.362* 0.794 0.692
(0.089) (0.085) (0.113) (0.113) (0.299) (0.306) (0.158) (0.161) (0.198) (0.206) (0.838) (0.819)
December 0.077 0.086 0.035 0.056 -0.283 -0.296 0.007 0.059 0.508** 0.518** 0.255 0.132
(0.094) (0.090) (0.164) (0.164) (0.556) (0.557) (0.195) (0.198) (0.190) (0.188) (0.583) (0.595)
January -0.024 -0.026 0.039 0.050 0.626 0.609 -0.007 0.038 0.357* 0.365* 0.169 0.088
(0.093) (0.093) (0.147) (0.145) (0.391) (0.397) (0.159) (0.160) (0.182) (0.189) (0.510) (0.528)
February -0.005 -0.022 0.057 0.075 0.156 0.124 -0.138 -0.098 0.262 0.268 -0.440 -0.485
(0.091) (0.086) (0.130) (0.129) (0.494) (0.501) (0.136) (0.139) (0.215) (0.212) (0.736) (0.753)
March 0.061 0.066 -0.088 -0.060 0.128 0.129 0.053 0.093 0.040 0.045 -0.163 -0.213
(0.097) (0.089) (0.130) (0.129) (0.353) (0.371) (0.119) (0.121) (0.266) (0.257) (0.531) (0.549)
April -0.155* -0.137* 0.093 0.093 0.530* 0.560* 0.244 0.274 0.235 0.259 1.356 1.484*
(0.078) (0.072) (0.114) (0.114) (0.282) (0.322) (0.206) (0.203) (0.258) (0.268) (0.870) (0.854)
Year-variant control variables
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Table C.1 Estimation Results (HH Fixed Effects vs Year Variant HH Fixed Effects): Continued
HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH HH dif YHH
Year-variant control variables
Number of cattle 0.011 0.034** 0.014 -0.020 -0.121*** -0.303**
(0.008) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.032) (0.112)
Month-variant control variables
Number of male HH member -0.048 -0.175** -0.216*** -0.189*** -0.260 -0.248 -0.116** -0.129** -0.104 -0.136 0.264 -0.153
(0.035) (0.070) (0.072) (0.068) (0.208) (0.336) (0.052) (0.059) (0.076) (0.096) (0.187) (0.211)
Number of female HH member -0.188*** -0.156*** -0.262*** -0.118** -0.157 -0.296 -0.313*** -0.243* -0.404*** -0.380** 0.277 0.051
(0.041) (0.038) (0.074) (0.053) (0.202) (0.215) (0.083) (0.127) (0.119) (0.150) (0.437) (0.263)
Number of child HH member (0-3 years) -0.087** 0.003 -0.096** -0.015 -0.203 0.153 0.046 -0.010 -0.037 0.073 -0.385 0.519**
(0.041) (0.048) (0.045) (0.071) (0.140) (0.133) (0.064) (0.091) (0.083) (0.109) (0.342) (0.186)
Number of child HH member (4-6 years) -0.210*** -0.348** -0.196*** -0.440* -0.366** -0.097 -0.069 -0.170 -0.326* -0.600*** -0.352 -0.926***
(0.054) (0.133) (0.068) (0.238) (0.175) (0.219) (0.110) (0.113) (0.165) (0.164) (0.277) (0.209)
Number of child HH member (7-9 years) -0.158*** -0.041 -0.221*** -0.011 -0.311** 0.061 -0.205** -0.514*** -0.525*** -0.403*** -0.265 0.727
(0.055) (0.070) (0.067) (0.134) (0.126) (0.141) (0.096) (0.119) (0.123) (0.137) (0.294) (0.489)
Number of child HH member (10-12 years) -0.117** -0.077 -0.084* 0.051 -0.141 -0.226 -0.199*** 0.053 -0.515*** -0.038 -0.340 0.196
(0.051) (0.068) (0.047) (0.091) (0.151) (0.382) (0.048) (0.049) (0.124) (0.123) (0.201) (0.210)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes -
Household Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes -
Period * Household No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.191 0.226 0.248 0.288 0.086 0.100 0.324 0.333 0.234 0.244 0.100 0.114
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.2: Estimation Results (No Adjustment of Adult Equivalent)
VARIABLES Total Staple Other Food Non Food Total Staple Other Food Non Food
Income Shock * Month Dummy
May -0.259 -0.183 -0.148 -0.742 -0.432** 0.004 -0.635* -0.902
(0.366) (0.276) (0.377) (0.992) (0.168) (0.220) (0.310) (0.673)
June -0.025 0.076 0.060 -0.497 -0.547*** 0.008 -0.869*** -0.971**
(0.262) (0.233) (0.251) (0.991) (0.147) (0.163) (0.239) (0.357)
July -0.009 -0.024 0.123 -0.337 -0.413*** -0.093 -0.404*** -1.191***
(0.227) (0.254) (0.229) (0.745) (0.073) (0.111) (0.109) (0.330)
August 0.102 0.039 -0.109 0.833 -0.417*** -0.156 -0.397* -1.084**
(0.205) (0.193) (0.183) (0.702) (0.088) (0.117) (0.203) (0.383)
September -0.199 0.043 -0.109 -1.011 -0.514** -0.255 -0.337 -1.610
(0.325) (0.201) (0.259) (1.323) (0.192) (0.251) (0.200) (1.099)
Octobor 0.119 0.147 0.121 0.048 -0.346* -0.041 -0.480* -0.692
(0.254) (0.161) (0.251) (0.805) (0.183) (0.161) (0.276) (0.402)
November -0.094 0.142 -0.203 -0.350 -1.026* -0.100 -0.726* -4.027
(0.201) (0.226) (0.229) (0.710) (0.544) (0.152) (0.368) (2.650)
December -0.106 0.250 -0.164 -0.787 -0.298** -0.118 -0.535** -0.072
(0.281) (0.223) (0.208) (1.099) (0.136) (0.157) (0.231) (0.342)
January 0.107 0.015 0.278 -0.145 -0.177* 0.053 -0.306** -0.365
(0.332) (0.226) (0.469) (0.849) (0.097) (0.109) (0.111) (0.302)
February -0.105 0.057 0.109 -1.074 -0.456*** -0.415** -0.312* -0.948**
(0.274) (0.228) (0.223) (1.012) (0.080) (0.164) (0.165) (0.430)
March 0.085 0.055 0.072 0.192 -0.610*** -0.219 -0.939*** -0.632
(0.242) (0.220) (0.247) (0.695) (0.182) (0.158) (0.330) (0.367)
April -0.114 -0.000 -0.000 -0.695 -1.665* -0.222 -1.698* -4.975
(0.291) (0.206) (0.307) (0.817) (0.958) (0.130) (0.878) (3.503)
Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle
May 0.014 0.048 -0.017 0.021 0.018 0.147 0.151 -0.650*
(0.035) (0.030) (0.039) (0.089) (0.126) (0.102) (0.152) (0.356)
June -0.034 -0.021 -0.022 -0.094 0.049 -0.049 0.324* -0.477
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.157) (0.195) (0.222) (0.158) (0.472)
July -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 -0.047 -0.047 -0.027 0.062 -0.394
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.048) (0.206) (0.217) (0.225) (0.465)
August -0.008 0.003 -0.008 -0.035 0.136 0.142 0.142 0.106
(0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.103) (0.181) (0.113) (0.230) (0.463)
September 0.046 0.038 0.006 0.170 0.075 0.310*** 0.171 -0.739
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.154) (0.145) (0.104) (0.181) (0.455)
Octobor -0.015 -0.004 -0.023 -0.018 0.083 0.207** 0.170 -0.447
(0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.061) (0.158) (0.074) (0.207) (0.354)
November -0.006 -0.021 -0.006 0.031 -0.005 0.223** 0.191 -1.076
(0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.055) (0.182) (0.088) (0.177) (0.637)
December 0.024 -0.023 0.062* 0.029 0.153 0.043 0.343** -0.108
(0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.069) (0.118) (0.131) (0.137) (0.385)
January -0.019 -0.007 -0.056 0.050 0.086 0.030 0.227 -0.169
(0.030) (0.024) (0.046) (0.077) (0.135) (0.091) (0.142) (0.405)
February 0.031 0.027 0.028 0.051 0.348*** 0.391*** 0.473*** -0.094
(0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.072) (0.112) (0.083) (0.131) (0.410)
March -0.011 -0.016 -0.014 0.009 0.309** 0.183** 0.522*** 0.025
(0.026) (0.031) (0.029) (0.057) (0.123) (0.082) (0.149) (0.390)
April 0.032 0.047** 0.007 0.066 -0.142 -0.060 0.104 -1.010
(0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.068) (0.231) (0.102) (0.248) (0.787)
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
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Table C.2 Estimation Results (No Adjustment of Adult Equivalent): Continued
VARIABLES Total Staple Other Food Non Food Total Staple Other Food Non Food
Month Dummy (08/09 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June -0.067 0.029 -0.034 -0.382 -0.155 0.067 -0.206 -0.537
(0.103) (0.081) (0.141) (0.478) (0.095) (0.083) (0.152) (0.725)
July 0.207 0.188 -0.043 0.938 -0.166 0.075 -0.310** -0.335
(0.247) (0.182) (0.191) (1.087) (0.122) (0.111) (0.118) (0.637)
August -0.033 0.185 -0.143 -0.241 -0.154 0.187 -0.247* -0.704
(0.125) (0.125) (0.174) (0.585) (0.130) (0.160) (0.141) (0.854)
September 0.132 0.034 -0.077 0.938 -0.164 0.160 -0.269** -0.639
(0.199) (0.111) (0.148) (1.048) (0.138) (0.153) (0.124) (0.714)
Octobor -0.232** -0.124 -0.159 -0.687** -0.153 0.104 -0.203** -0.619
(0.097) (0.089) (0.157) (0.337) (0.114) (0.137) (0.075) (0.793)
November -0.205** -0.066 -0.147 -0.690* 0.045 0.143 -0.234 0.580
(0.096) (0.100) (0.161) (0.389) (0.207) (0.119) (0.153) (1.076)
December -0.112 0.021 -0.078 -0.517 -0.192* 0.218 -0.291** -0.889
(0.111) (0.084) (0.146) (0.469) (0.110) (0.137) (0.127) (0.840)
January -0.044 0.236*** -0.111 -0.521 -0.297*** 0.167* -0.515*** -0.795
(0.114) (0.078) (0.168) (0.419) (0.098) (0.090) (0.177) (0.731)
February -0.036 0.180** -0.167 -0.187 -0.119 0.162 -0.196 -0.566
(0.149) (0.088) (0.143) (0.759) (0.155) (0.110) (0.172) (0.921)
March 0.087 0.392*** 0.085 -0.626 -0.029 0.305* -0.062 -0.723
(0.101) (0.132) (0.175) (0.404) (0.169) (0.150) (0.202) (0.857)
April -0.124 0.128 -0.101 -0.783** -0.028 0.157 -0.135 -0.170
(0.100) (0.094) (0.154) (0.340) (0.192) (0.096) (0.191) (0.957)
Month Dummy (09/10 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June 0.299* 0.030 0.072 1.555* 0.192*** 0.202* 0.181 0.199
(0.171) (0.101) (0.150) (0.803) (0.061) (0.113) (0.126) (0.170)
July 0.043 0.019 -0.104 0.499 0.090 0.090 0.020 0.280
(0.163) (0.138) (0.173) (0.505) (0.070) (0.072) (0.057) (0.314)
August 0.013 -0.067 -0.006 0.250 -0.053 -0.014 -0.076 -0.082
(0.131) (0.123) (0.182) (0.504) (0.098) (0.143) (0.113) (0.357)
September 0.018 -0.203 0.071 0.393 0.030 -0.033 0.084 0.029
(0.180) (0.131) (0.172) (0.722) (0.080) (0.116) (0.095) (0.288)
Octobor -0.139 -0.269** 0.049 -0.353 -0.053 -0.132* 0.044 -0.131
(0.089) (0.104) (0.112) (0.290) (0.085) (0.074) (0.131) (0.329)
November -0.159 -0.243** -0.027 -0.325 -0.070 -0.161 0.023 -0.109
(0.101) (0.117) (0.160) (0.261) (0.153) (0.110) (0.231) (0.418)
December 0.117 -0.151 0.326* 0.175 -0.001 -0.014 0.052 -0.118
(0.152) (0.135) (0.165) (0.469) (0.161) (0.111) (0.239) (0.354)
January 0.085 0.134 0.279 -0.561 0.072 0.006 0.140 0.040
(0.179) (0.154) (0.272) (0.355) (0.138) (0.091) (0.195) (0.309)
February 0.108 0.030 0.098 0.316 0.097 0.035 -0.020 0.567
(0.121) (0.126) (0.162) (0.444) (0.150) (0.083) (0.220) (0.637)
March 0.134 0.222 0.237* -0.359 0.081 0.025 0.154 0.011
(0.107) (0.152) (0.124) (0.355) (0.131) (0.083) (0.254) (0.324)
April -0.066 -0.052 0.056 -0.435* -0.001 -0.078 0.065 -0.002
(0.107) (0.108) (0.151) (0.239) (0.127) (0.123) (0.222) (0.371)
rs)
le)
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Table C.2 Estimation Results (No Adjustment of Adult Equivalent): Continued
VARIABLES Total Staple Other Food Non Food Total Staple Other Food Non Food
Month Dummy (10/11 Crop Year)
 ( Compared with May )
June -0.145 0.058 -0.175* -0.540 0.236** 0.059 0.262* 0.581
(0.092) (0.072) (0.087) (0.453) (0.097) (0.136) (0.143) (0.555)
July -0.054 -0.032 -0.169 0.210 0.231* 0.143 0.102 0.791
(0.157) (0.090) (0.113) (0.747) (0.129) (0.313) (0.167) (0.667)
August -0.100 -0.033 -0.099 -0.258 0.182 0.201 0.185 0.129
(0.091) (0.072) (0.120) (0.410) (0.155) (0.306) (0.327) (0.851)
September -0.019 0.137 -0.002 -0.434 0.261 0.420** -0.164 1.051
(0.132) (0.114) (0.099) (0.559) (0.242) (0.161) (0.255) (1.012)
Octobor -0.131 -0.196*** 0.078 -0.554 0.021 0.226 0.008 -0.425
(0.126) (0.069) (0.104) (0.531) (0.211) (0.413) (0.226) (0.609)
November -0.172** -0.136* 0.000 -0.726** 0.593 -0.263 0.202 3.679
(0.084) (0.078) (0.107) (0.284) (0.600) (0.374) (0.190) (2.931)
December 0.474** 0.043 0.747*** 0.738 0.139 -0.145 0.671 -0.652
(0.221) (0.100) (0.169) (0.931) (0.194) (0.183) (0.440) (0.679)
January -0.083 -0.094 0.173 -0.762 -0.112 -0.373 0.187 -0.316
(0.122) (0.076) (0.129) (0.496) (0.153) (0.335) (0.260) (0.683)
February 0.020 -0.032 0.113 -0.117 0.190 0.176 0.094 0.484
(0.142) (0.092) (0.133) (0.604) (0.136) (0.164) (0.223) (0.871)
March -0.021 -0.037 0.202 -0.596 0.279 -0.050 0.580 0.227
(0.137) (0.096) (0.156) (0.476) (0.201) (0.158) (0.394) (0.712)
April 0.053 -0.057 0.138 0.082 1.623 -0.089 1.741 5.330
(0.117) (0.108) (0.127) (0.345) (1.235) (0.210) (1.094) (4.265)
Month Dummy* Dummy=1 if growing maize in dry season
June 0.209* 0.118 0.158* 0.565 0.114 0.009 0.261 -0.042
(0.110) (0.076) (0.092) (0.516) (0.086) (0.131) (0.152) (0.356)
July -0.006 0.050 0.027 -0.227 0.101 0.031 0.336*** -0.379
(0.168) (0.122) (0.125) (0.727) (0.110) (0.180) (0.107) (0.468)
August 0.066 -0.034 0.157 0.048 0.257* -0.067 0.522*** 0.297
(0.096) (0.096) (0.132) (0.407) (0.126) (0.167) (0.136) (0.517)
September 0.024 0.068 0.060 -0.179 0.139 -0.179 0.296** 0.459
(0.142) (0.167) (0.112) (0.573) (0.137) (0.142) (0.130) (0.583)
Octobor 0.065 -0.011 0.039 0.317 0.152 -0.098 0.277** 0.398
(0.103) (0.087) (0.116) (0.363) (0.106) (0.162) (0.112) (0.518)
November 0.166* 0.026 0.218** 0.354 0.300 -0.015 0.342* 0.924
(0.084) (0.094) (0.108) (0.304) (0.204) (0.159) (0.193) (0.928)
December 0.018 0.092 0.039 -0.215 0.263* 0.006 0.523** 0.156
(0.156) (0.098) (0.176) (0.538) (0.147) (0.187) (0.205) (0.486)
January 0.113 -0.012 0.029 0.642 0.170 -0.004 0.344* 0.101
(0.119) (0.099) (0.160) (0.391) (0.124) (0.159) (0.168) (0.435)
February 0.042 0.011 0.045 0.107 -0.028 -0.127 0.240 -0.530
(0.124) (0.100) (0.132) (0.530) (0.140) (0.124) (0.209) (0.644)
March 0.001 0.076 -0.111 0.131 -0.007 0.060 0.023 -0.249
(0.105) (0.103) (0.139) (0.357) (0.137) (0.100) (0.248) (0.448)
April 0.060 -0.164* 0.069 0.565* 0.459 0.204 0.288 1.529
(0.090) (0.088) (0.119) (0.289) (0.298) (0.197) (0.298) (1.047)
le)
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Table C.2 Estimation Results (No Adjustment of Adult Equivalent): Continued
VARIABLES Total Staple Other Food Non Food Total Staple Other Food Non Food
Year-variant control variables
Number of cattle 0.022** 0.011 0.035** 0.015 -0.100*** 0.003 -0.109*** -0.318**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.037) (0.127)
Month-variant control variables -0.163** -0.039 -0.231*** -0.270 -0.030 -0.098 -0.067 0.230
Number of male HH member (0.065) (0.040) (0.082) (0.220) (0.063) (0.057) (0.090) (0.198)
-0.216*** -0.173*** -0.269*** -0.169 -0.272** -0.333*** -0.485*** 0.453
Number of female HH member (0.066) (0.044) (0.092) (0.216) (0.122) (0.064) (0.147) (0.525)
Number of child HH member (0-3 years) -0.186*** -0.156*** -0.178*** -0.280* -0.145 -0.027 -0.103 -0.536
(0.050) (0.048) (0.053) (0.150) (0.095) (0.059) (0.094) (0.390)
Number of child HH member (4-6 years) -0.293*** -0.258*** -0.276*** -0.420** -0.170 -0.051 -0.239 -0.264
(0.071) (0.062) (0.087) (0.182) (0.124) (0.091) (0.172) (0.329)
Number of child HH member (7-9 years) -0.241*** -0.170*** -0.261*** -0.351** -0.341*** -0.215** -0.509*** -0.176
(0.055) (0.059) (0.077) (0.131) (0.114) (0.090) (0.135) (0.340)
Number of child HH member (10-12 years) -0.127*** -0.141** -0.106* -0.150 -0.427*** -0.253*** -0.567*** -0.456*
(0.046) (0.057) (0.055) (0.156) (0.094) (0.051) (0.138) (0.243)
Fixed Effect
Period * Village Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period * household No No No No No No No No
(i) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy) 0.59 0.64 0.57 1.01 30.86 6.44 12.92 2.35
p-value 0.8387 0.7920 0.8540 0.4536 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(ii) F-statistics
(Income Shock * Month Dummy * Cattle) 3.23 44.65 2.94 0.84 22.76 41.07 8.55 3.53
p-value 0.0023 0.0001 0.0046 0.6132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0062
Observations 5,132 5,132 5,132 5,132 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.218 0.228 0.265 0.083 0.221 0.413 0.274 0.102
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F(12,43) F(12,20)
F(12,43) F(12,20)
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